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I. INTRODUCTION
"Smartcontracts ... guaranteea very specific set ofoutcomes. There's never
any confusion and there's never any needfor litigation."
~ JeffGarzik'
"Ifthe blockchainpromise comes to a reality ... most goods, labor and capital
will be allocatedthrough decentralizedglobalplatforms. Disputes will certainlyarise."

~ Cl6ment Lesaege and
Federico Ast 2

Blockchain-based "smart" contracts may characterize much of the future of exchange as they
expand the scope of potentially efficient bargains through restructuring and reducing transaction
costs relative to traditional contracts. This Article analyzes the changes in transaction costs and
execution efficiencies as contractual "distance"-the number of intermediaries required to make an
exchange, weighted by the rational level of actual agreement between parties-increases between
bespoke contracts, template contracts, contracts of adhesion, and algorithmic contracts housed on
platforms like Ethereum and arbitrated on platforms such as Kleros. This framework shows that smart
contracts have the potential to lower the contractual distance required to make an exchange by (1)
overcoming trust issues that require intermediaries, (2) lowering the incentive to write certain kinds
of boilerplate, and (3) increasing the incentive to understand contractual terms. As a result, wide
implementation of smart contracts may return contract law closer to the legal ideal of mutual
understanding as the basis for exchange. At the same time, these auto-executing agreements risk
making the future of contract law a return to the era of sealed instruments, enforcing themselves
regardless of impossibility, fraud, and other legal safeguards. As examples of these costs and benefits,
the Article focuses on smart contracts in two industries: the environmental public goods sector and
the film industry. These industries illustrate the potential for smart contracts as well as steps that can
be taken to ensure that as code becomes law, it will retain the doctrinal wisdom applied to contracts
before they became "smart."
Jeff Lingwall is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Boise State University; J.D.,
Yale Law School; Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University; Ramya Mogallapu studies disruptive
technologies in film at Truman State University. We thank Jared Favero, Scott Halbert, and Ryan
Bunselmeyer for able assistance and William Fries, Jeremy Rehagen, David Gillette, and Becky Pitel
for helpful comments. Any errors are our own.
Jeff Garzik is the co-founder of Bloq, a popular blockhain services company. See Bloq:
Tokenization of Things, BLOQ, https://www.bloq.com/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) ("Bloq delivers
comprehensive, enterprise class blockchain solutions to business, while continuing to support
innovation in the blockchain and open-source ecosystem."). The quote is widely cited in blockchain
literature. E.g., Joseph Aamidor, Blockchain: Coming to a Smart Building Near You, GREEN TECH
MEDIA (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/blockchain-coming-to-asmart-building-near-you#gs.pJrdM3AM (quoting Garzik); Sue Troy, What is a Smart Contract and
What's It Good For, TECH TARGET (Apr. 2016), https://searchcio.techtarget.com/feature/What-is-asmart-contract-and-whats-it-good-for(quoting Garzik).
2 Cldment Lesaege & Federico Ast, Kleros: Short Paper v1.0.6, KLEROS (Nov. 2018),
https://kleros.io/assets/whitepaper.pdf (motivating Kleros, a "decentralized application built on top
of Ethereum that works as a decentralized third party to arbitrate disputes in every kind of contract,
from very simple to highly complex ones. It relies on game theoretic incentives to have jurors rule
cases correctly. The result is a dispute resolution system that renders ultimate judgments in a fast,
inexpensive, reliable and decentralized way.").

286

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:2

Modem contract law is built on a theory of mutual understanding. It
should be troubling that the majority of modern contracts, using boilerplate-heavy
forms, are largely not mutually understood. This Article argues that "smart"
contracts-code-based exchanges of value housed on blockchains-restructure
and reduce transaction costs relative to traditional form contracts in ways that can
incentivize mutual understanding. They have the potential to increase actual
"meeting of the minds," even while facilitating market interactions between
physically and socially remote parties. This is possible because smart contracts (1)
use shared digital ledgers to eliminate trust issues and contractual intermediaries,
(2) reduce costs to record and transfer property rights, especially for fractional
amounts, and (3) upfront many of the transactions costs to contract, as parties must
overcome ambiguity and deal with eventualities when trusting their agreement to
code. Together, these decrease the incentive for drafters to write certain kinds of
boilerplate, increase the incentive for acceptors to understand contractual terms,
and have the potential to return contracting closer to a "legal regime grounded in
6
actual agreement with common understanding."

See DANIEL MARKOVITS, CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL METHODS 1240-41 (2012) (good faith work
towards a shared project, by non-intimates, in the face of imperfect planning, is at contract's "core,"
differentiating itself from tort and fiduciary obligation as a distinct legal doctrine).
Meaning, 132 HARV.
4 See Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-ContractandShared

L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2019)(arguing that the boilerplate dominating modern contract law should be
termed "pseudo-contract"); see generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 34-35 (1983) ("[W]hat was previously conceived to
be private law has also been transformed in the twentieth century by the radical centralization and
bureaucratization ofeconomic life ... Contract law, for example, which has traditionally been viewed

in all Western legal systems as a body of rules for giving effect to voluntary legal agreement

according to the intent of the parties, within limits set by broad public policies, has in the twentieth
century struggled to adapt itself to a wholly new economic situation in which the detailed terms of

the most important kinds of contracts are specifically required by legislation or else set forth in

standard forms presented by large-scale business organizations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.").
5 For example, smart contracting would typically reduce the cost ofobservability and verification in
execution. Joshua S. Gans, The Fine Print in Smart Contracts (Jan. 13, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3309709. See also Jeremy M.
Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 263, 291 (2017)

(discussing the inefficiencies in requiring code to reflect human linguistic exchange). In Sklaroff's
framework, the lack of inflexibility is a "major challenge" to the technology. Id. In our view, the lack
of flexibility leads to positive changes in the incentives of party to create boilerplate adhesion
contracts. On trust, see Trevor 1. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 574 (2015) ("In short, the blockchain is a 'trustless' technology.
xchanges for value over a computer network can
'Trustless' means-for the first time in history
be verified, monitored, and enforced without the presence ofatrusted third party or central institution.

Because the blockchain is an authentication and verification technology, it can enable more efficient
title transfers and ownership verification. Because it is programmable, it can enable conditional
'smart' contracts. Because it is decentralized, it can perform these functions with minimal trust

without using centralized institutions. Because it is borderless and frictionless, it can provide a
cheaper, faster infrastructure for exchanging units of value.") (footnotes omitted).
6 Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140.
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The long history of contract is a story of law interacting with the
technology facilitating agreement, such as printing or information technology.
Blockchain is no exception. The ability of blockchains to record, execute, and
enforce code-based exchanges holds immense promise to increase the contractual
surplus available to parties.9 It is likely not exaggerating to suggest that as
7

See infra Section 2.
That blockchain is the "future" is touted of such disparate disciplines and endeavors as law,
accounting, finance, agriculture, and entertainment. See, e.g., Hugh Son, JP Morgan Rolls out First
US Bank-Backed Cryptocurrency to Transform Payments Business, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2019),
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/jp-morgan-is-rolling-out-the-first-us-bank-backed-cryptocurrency-totransform-payments--.html; Andrew Arnold, The Agricultural Supply Chain Can Massively Benefit
From
Blockchain,
FORBES
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewarnold/2018/09/14/the-agricultural-supply-chain-canmassively-benefit-from-blockchain/#ae83efl90235 ("The use of blockchain could feasibly result in
. . . greater trust in global food growers and suppliers would be established, because fraudulent
certifications and labeling could be eliminated."); Benny L. Kass, Does the Future OfReal Estate
Include
Blockchain
Technology?,
WASH.
POST
(July
13,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/does-the-future-of-real-estate-include-blockchaintechnology/2018/07/12/0a556a50-7bdf-Ie8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_story.html?noredirect-on&utm
term-.9bec082bbd92 ("The Swedish government recently started using Blockchain to register land
and properties"); Ana Alexandre, IBM and Jewelry Industry Leaders to Use Blockchain to Trace
Origin of Diamonds, CoIN TELEGRAPH (Apr. 27, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ibm-andjewelry-industry-leaders-to-use-blockchain-to-trace-origin-of-diamonds
(use of blockchain in
"aiming to assure customers that theirjewelry purchases are ethically sourced"); Sunny Dhillon, How
Blockchain Can Transform the Future of Entertainment, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2018/02/01/how-blockchain-can-transform-the-futureof-entertainment/#
90505c86b6b5 ("This technology solves the problems surrounding content access, distribution and
compensation; managing assets and digital rights; and financing."); Bernard Marr, This Is Why
Blockchains
Will
Transform
Healthcare,
FORBES
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/11/29/this-is-why-blockchains-will-transformhealthcare/#6213d2501ebe (discussing how society can use blockchain "to ... create a common
database of health information that doctors and providers could access no matter what electronic
medical system they used, higher security, and privacy, less admin time for doctors so there's more
time to spend on patient care, and even better sharing of research results"); Lisa Walker, This New
Carbon Currency Could Make Us More Climate Friendly, WORLD EcoNOMIC FORUM (Sept. 19,
2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/09/carbon-currency-blockchain-poseidon-ecosphere/
(noting blockchain "will be able measure, track and trade emissions transparently.").
9 See, e.g, Michael Corkey & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks Its
Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/walmartblockchain-lettuce.html("By this time next year, more than 100 farms that supply Walmart with
leafy green vegetables will be required to input detailed information about their food into a
blockchain database."); Kate Rooney, 84% Of CompaniesAre Dabblingin Blockchain, New Survey
Says, CNBC (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/27/84percent-of-companies-aredabbling--in-blockchain-new-survey-says-.html ("Everyone is talking about blockchain, and no one
wants to be left behind."); Kevin Parrish, Google Bets on Blockchain Technology with Two New
Google
Cloud
Partnerships,
DIGITAL
TRENDS
(July
23,
2018),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/google-cloud-platform-to-support-blockchain-tech/
("Google now supports distributed ledger technology, aka blockchain, on the Google Cloud
Platform."); Muyao Shen, Facebook Has a New Director of Engineeringfor Blockchain, COINDESK
(July 6, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/facebook-appoints-new-blockchain-engineering-director/
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technological hurdles are reduced and more physical assets are given digital
representations, blockchain-based contracts will replace traditional contracting in
many applications. 0
Consider an example of how recording and transferring property rights on
a blockchain might look in practice, compared to traditional exchanges. In the film
industry, the basic economic exchange is the viewer's payment given in exchange
for the right to view a piece of art. This exchange is facilitated by a vast number of
intermediaries. A movie studio might engage in an outside source of funding,
hiring a director and producer who then manage production and hire actors. The
studio then markets the film and collects funds from theatres as viewers attend.
These intermediaries are required to establish the trust needed to secure initial
funding in this high-risk business, and trust issues between the intermediaries
themselves necessitate long contracts of adhesion covering many eventualities.
Smart contracts offer an alternative. Consider the company DECENT," a global
blockchain-based distribution platform, launched by Matej Michalko and Matej
Boda1 2 to overcome the increasing impact of concentrated power in the

&

("In May that the company launched a team specifically to explore this emerging technology."); Kate
Rooney, Amazon Is Moving into Blockchain with a New Partnership, CNBC (May 15, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/amazon-is-moving-into-blockchain-with-a-newpartnership.html ("The tech giant's cloud computing arm is partnering with a start-up called Kaleido
to make it easier for customers to put their services on blockchain."); Hugh McIntyre, Spotify Has
2017),
27,
(Apr.
FORBES
Mediachain,
Startup
Blockchain
Acquired
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2017/04/27/spotify-has-acquired-blockchain-startupmediachain/#3cbf573969ee ("Many are touting blockchain companies like Mediachain as potential
saviors of the industry, as they can typically help not only with correcting payouts, but doing so in a
more transparent and efficient manner."). Undoubtedly some of these sources reflect hype or
publicity rather than sound forays into the future, but technology is often overestimated in the short
run and underestimated in the long run. See Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to
Smart Contracts and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations, HAR. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/ansmart
("Today,
introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potential-and-inherent-linitations/
contracts are a prototypical example of 'Amara's Law,' the concept articulated by Stanford
University computer scientist Roy Amara that we tend to overestimate new technology in the short
run and underestimate it in the long run.").
'0 Some have argued that the term "smart contract" is a misnomer, as "'smart contracts' are neither
smart nor contracts." James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, PENN J. L
INNOVATION (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id=3315703
(quoting Ed Felten, Smart Contracts: Neither Smart nor Contracts?, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Feb. 20,

We
2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/02/20/smart-contracts-neither-smart-notcontracts/).
discuss smart contracts both as "mechanisms that enforce agreements," id., but also as embodying
the entire agreement between parties. In our view, both are "smart contracts" meriting discussion.
DECENT stands for Decentralized Network; Encrypted and Secure; Content Distribution System;
Elimination of 3rd Parties; New Way of Online Publishing; Timestamped Data Records.See DECENT,
What is DECENT?, https://decent.ch/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
12 See Michael Scott, Decent Launches GlobalMedia DistributionPlatform, BITCOIN MAG.(June 30,

https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/decent-launches-global-media-distribution-platform/
2017),
(the initial funding for the platform was granted by an ICO that was able to raise an equivalent of
$4.2 million at the time).
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entertainment sector. Through DECENT, creators are able to distribute (e.g.,
stream) digital content in a peer-to-peer fashion. Dealing with the blockchainbased system requires additional up-front investment, but then avoids the cost of
third-party fees. The founders sought to ease access into the digital entertainment
market by lowering the barriers of entry often placed upon incoming content
creators. Through the platform, creators can share any type of content, from
audiobooks to video files. The content remains void of influence from third parties,
and creators have freedom in setting their own IP rights and prices.13 As a result of
its blockchain-based nature, nothing may be removed or censored on the platform,
and transactions take place without costly intermediaries.14
These potential efficiency gains for smart contracting versus traditional
contracting currently face two significant challenges: rendering contracts to code
requires a specialized, non-legal skillset, and moving representation of physical
assets into digital spaces (referred to as "tokenizing") is currently limited.1 5
Rendering an exchange to code-based form requires expertise not typically
developed during law school, nor accessible to the average attorney. For example,
smart contracts housed on the Ethereum blockchain network are written in a
language called Solidity, "an object-oriented, high-level language ... influenced
by C++, Python and JavaScript . . . . Solidity is statically typed, supports
inheritance, libraries and complex user-defined types among other features."'6 This
is language generally used in computer science, not in contract law. Even if the
language is mastered and a contract drafted, digital contracts can only supplement
traditional agreements unless the subject matter of the contract has some
representation in digital form. When the asset to be exchanged is itself digital, like
Bitcoin or Ethereum ether, this is not a problem, but creating a digital
representation of a typical rental agreement is challenging.' These barriers
13 For a discussion of extended issues in blockchain and smart
contract copyright issues, see BalAzs
Bod6, Daniel Gervais, & Joao Pedro Quintais, Blockchain and Smart Contracts: The Missing Link
in CopyrightLicensing?, 26 INT'L J. L. & INFo. TECH. 311 (2018).
14 This presents issues in solving disputes between creators as it makes involvement from centralized
institutions of justice impractical. Federico Ast, Cl6ment Lesage and Nicolas Wagner foresaw this
massive issue with the development of decentralized economies and developed a decentralized
dispute resolution platform known as Kleros. See KLEROS, The Blockchain Dispute Resolution Layer,
https://kleros.io/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). If DECENT chose to implement Kleros into their smart
contracts one could flag another's film as containing plagiarized material belonging to her, an
anonymous jury would then decide if the claim was accurate and decide how much revenue should
be redirected.
1s See Founder Starcoin, Inc. v. Launch Labs, Inc., No. 18-CV-972 JLS (MDD), 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1137372018, at *113757 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018) ("Tokens are the native crypto-assets of a
blockchain app.").
16 SOLIDITY, Solidity, https:H/solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.3/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
17 The ability to enter an apartment could be given based on using
a smartphone to access the state
of a variable on the blockchain, which would be keyed to whether rent has been paid or not. These
require additional programming skills beyond Solidity itself. See Smart Tenancy Contracts, SMART
CONTRACT LEASING: THE BLOCKCHAIN LEDGER, https://smartcontractleasing.io/smart-tenancycontracts/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019) (describing the steps to establish blockchain-based lease
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involved in implementing smart contracts restrict their use to novelty frameworks
or when very specific transactional gains exist, such as transferring large sums of
money more quickly than possible with wire transfer.is
If, and when, these technological barriers shrink and these types of
exchanges become common, they have the potential to transfigure how assets are
recorded and transferred.19 With this potential in mind, it is instructive to carefully
consider how smart contracting relates to the long history of exchange, the
transactions costs involved in bargains, and how the law has, at various times, dealt
with those costs. We organize this history around the idea of the contractual
"distance" required to make an exchange, equal to the number of intermediaries
needed to facilitate the bargain, weighted by the rational level of actual agreement
between parties.20 A simple point-of-sale contract has low contractual distance, as
buyer and seller negotiate and then exchange assets without the need for
agreements). See generally PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW:
THE RULE OF CODE 77 (2018) ("Smart contracts-at least for the immediate future-will not be able

to account for these more open-ended rights and obligations.").
18 For example, the Bitcoin transaction fee is independent of the actual quantity of coin being
transferred. From a computational perspective, changing a ledger entry by one is no different than
changing a ledger entry by one million.
'9 With large potential efficiency gains but equally large technological hurdles for parties,
blockchain-based smart contracts are similar to a disruptive technology. Disruptive technologies start

as non-premium products, ignored by main market competitors focused on higher-margin areas. Over
time, the disruptive technology improves, and eventually swallows the larger market. As the technical
barriers to implementing smart contracts fall, their potential areas for practical use are exploding. As
these changes continue, what is currently a very specialized niche relative to traditional contracting

will begin to impact the law, perhaps even to the point it will replace lawyers and traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms to a large extent. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S
DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TOFAIL (1997); Clayton M. Christensen,

Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What is Disruptive Innovation, HARV. Bus. REv.44 (2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation (revisiting disruptive innovation after twenty
ears).
o See Anselm Lenhard, Origin and DistributionofDebt: Risks and Regulatory Solutions, 2 EUR. J.
RISK REG. 340, 345 (2011) (discussing the "contractual 'distance' between the borrower [of a loan]
and the ultimate holder of the risk," and characterizing contractual distance as "zero" when the
borrower and lender have a direct contract, and "increasing" when the loan is sold); cf Peter T.
Leeson, Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange, 37 J. LEG. STUD. 161, 164 (2008) ("Social

distance is the extent to which individuals share beliefs, customs, practices, appearances, and other
characteristics that define their identity."); id. at 162 ("A burgeoning literature highlights the success
of self-enforcing exchange relationships between socially homogenous agents. Inside small,

homogenous social groups, in which the social distance between actors is minimal, individuals can

&

rely on reputational mechanisms of ex post enforcement to ensure cooperation."). See generally
Robert A. Levine & Merry White, Parenthoodin Social Transformation,in PARENTING ACROSS THE
LIFE SPAN: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 275 (Jane B. Lancaster, Jeanne Altmann, Alice S. Rossi,
Lonnie R. Sherrod eds., 1987) (discussing "contractual distance" between workers and firms and the
process of industrialization); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretationand

Supplementation, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 1710, 1788 (1997) (discussing the "distance" between
policymakers and citizens in context ofcontract law); George A. Akerlof, Social Distanceand Social
Decisions, 65 ECONOMETRICA 1005, 1008-11 (1997) (modeling social distance between individuals
and the utility they derive from similar behavior).
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intermediaries, with terms generally easy to understand (e.g., exchange of a good,
for a price, subject to warranties on the good). 2 1 The exchange occurs because the
transactions costs required to make it are less than the benefits generated by the
deal. 2 2 A typical real estate contract has higher contractual distance, as trust issues
require paying for the services of a costly third-party intermediary to hold funds in
escrow until closing, and parties find it rational to sign stacks of documents without
reading them at closing. 3 A consumer adhesion contract would similarly have
higher contractual distance, as the parties may not need intermediaries, but the
boilerplate means the non-drafter typically finds the costs of reading exceed its
benefits. 24
The development of contract might be characterized as technology
facilitating exchange at increasingly greater contractual distance, with the law
struggling to catch up. While kinship networks and trusting relationships likely
25
characterized the beginnings of exchange, at low contractual distance, large
21 A consumer might not understand the technicalities ofU.C.C. warranties, but most consumers have

a sense that, e.g., the store selling the good likely has the right to sell it (title), that the good shouldn't
be defective (merchantability), and so on.
22 This exchange benefits not only the parties themselves, but the sociality of the market generally.
See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1517-18 (2004)
("[P]romises and contracts enable persons to cease to be strangers and to attend to their basic needs

for community-as expressed in Arendt's idea of'the will to live together with others in the mode of
acting and speaking' contract also enlists persons' broader ethical interests in the service of
overcoming egocentrism. Going forward, I will seek to develop these ideas and to display the
characteristicallyliberalformsofsocial solidarity that contract encourages-formsof solidarity that

do without intimacy and so avoid the taint of the clan. I shall try, in effect, to trace the progress of
sentiments that defuse egocentrism by analogy to the way in which Hume traced the progress of
sentiments that defuse egoism. I shall claim that the practice of contract - through the collaborative
ideals that it involves - plays an essential role in this progress. I shall therefore seek to reject the
common view that, regardless oftheir efficiency or other instrumental attractions, contract and other

market-based practices present an intrinsically debased form of human interaction, in which persons
are motivated by the uglier forms of self-interest, including most notably fear and greed. This view
underestimates, to my mind, the deeply and intrinsicallycommunal characterofcontractual and
market relations, and ignores these relations' contributions to addressing the threats to social
solidarity that egoism and egocentrism pose.") (emphasis added); id. at 1517 ("[C]ontract-and
through contract the market-has an effect on the reasons persons have, and not just the characters

that they display, that supports a particularly ambitious, liberal solution to the problem of social
unity.").
23 E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
404 (2005) ("The law of contract
was essentially negative. Its doctrines gave more or less free play to individual choice. What people
freely agreed on, courts would enforce ... Not much of this body of law changed fundamentally
between 1850 and 1900-nothing compared to the transformation of tort law, or the law of

corporations. Old technicalities [e.g., seals] had been dismantled long before 1850.").
&

24 Some would go so far as to refer to a boilerplate adhesion contract as pseudo-contract. Kar
Radin, supra note 4, at 1140 ("'[T]erms'-which now include enormous streams of boilerplate text
that are delivered but never read by anyone-are no longer terms with shared meaning.... The fake
'terms' in a pseudo-contract invite burgeoning forms of deception that are difficult for courts to
discern because they are hidden under the mantle of'contract."').
25 E.g., MARCEL MAuss, TlE Gir: THE FRM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 70

(W.D. Halls, trans., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1990) (1950) ("The system that we propose to
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business entities able to set their own adhesion-based contractual terms, often
relying on third-party intermediaries, came to dominate most individuals'
expectations of contract law. 26 The advent of duplicate copying in the twentieth
century facilitated these kinds of contracts, which reached their heyday in the
27
internet era that provided the ability to link to reams of digital boilerplate. In
other words, rather than two parties bargaining in individually-negotiated, bespoke
transactions, as enterprises became larger and deals more complex, the number of
steps and costs involved multiplied, enforced with form contracts. The law came
along in fits and spurts. The early common law focused on sealed instruments,
enforceable even against arguments going to the heart of the modem assent theory
of contract, such as fraud.2 8 Perhaps due to legal inadequacies like these, the
medieval law merchant created a semi-independent decentralized enforcement
system for exchanges and dispute resolution.29 Eventually, the intervention of
call the system of 'total services', from clan to clan-the system in which individuals and groups
exchange everything with one another-constitutes the most ancient system of economy and law that
we can find or of which we can conceive."); cf Markovits, supra note 222, at 1419("Promises lie at
the center of persons' moral experience of one another, and contracts lie at the center of their legal
experience of one another. Many of the most important relationships in our moral and legal culture
characteristically arise in connection with promises and contracts of some form or other: Persons'
families are connected to marriage promises, their work is connected to employment contracts, and
even their citizenship is connected (albeit metaphorically) to the social contract. In all these cases,
and in myriad others, promises and contracts establish relations among the persons who engage
them."); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, DoesAnyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-FormContracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 1 (2014) ("Standardform contracts, often called fine print or boilerplate, are the most common type of economic contract.
They apply to untold billions of commercial transactions per year."); Russel Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHIC. L. REv. 1203, 1203
(2003) ("[N]early all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven.").
26 W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
IARV. L REV529, 529 (1971) (noting that as of 1971 "[s]tandard form contracts probably account
for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have difficulty
remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form; except for casual oral
agreements, they probably never have. But if they are active, they contract by standard form several
times a day.... Moreover, standard forms have come to dominate more than just routine transaction.
. . . The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as typical, in which both parties
participate in choosing the language of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than
historical importance.").
27 See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at1140-41 (describing the history of the technology of form
contracts).
28 JOHN II. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOw LERNER, &BRUCE

P. SMITH, HISTORICOF THE COMMON LAW:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 322 (2009) ("Seal or record was

conclusive on questions of liability, and accordingly, at common law the defenses of 'fraud, failure
of consideration, and accord and satisfaction were not pleadable. . . .') (quoting WILLIAM T.
BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQuITY23 (1914)). A sealed record even

prevent a plea of discharge, unless the discharge was evidenced by, e.g., another seal. Id.
were non-professional
29 See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 346-47 (1983) ("Market and court fairs ...
community tribunals; the judges were elected by the merchants of market or fair from among their
numbers .

.

..

In some countries, royal authority was asserted over merchant guilds and over town

markets and fairs, but even then the law merchant continued, in general, to be administered by
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equity reduced the importance of sealed instruments, and the law developed a slate
of legal doctrines aimed at protecting parties transacting at high distance.3
The genius of smart contracts is their ability to bring exchange, and law,
full circle, facilitating bargains by lowering contractual distance for complex
transactions at each step: removing the need for intermediaries and raising the
rational level of actual agreement between parties. 3 1 Consider again the film
financing example. The exchange between consumers and producers of film at the
heart of modem film-making is an incredibly high-distance transaction, requiring
agreements between multiple intermediaries, many of which will be formalized
with layers of boilerplate. A blockchain-based platform links creators with
consumers in one step, without intermediaries, and polices eventualities through
digital terms that rely on auto-execution of conditional statements rather than
reams of boilerplate. It can do this because trust issues lie at the heart of both
intermediaries and boilerplate: intermediaries are needed, at least in part, because
the parties cannot directly engage; boilerplate is needed, at least in part, because
the drafter does not fully trust the accepting parties and wishes to include
contractual terms covering the many possible ways they may breach.3 2 In this way,
smart contracts offer an economic solution to the problem of agreement over
boilerplate-they incentivize bringing mutual understanding out of the shadow of
the contract and into the light, as parties are motivated to understand their
agreement and the code memorializing it. 3 3 Fittingly, one logo used to promote

merchant judges.... In all types of commercial courts the procedure was marked by speed and
informality. Time limits were narrow: in the fair courts justice was to be done while the merchants'
feet were still dusty.... Often appeals were forbidden. Not only were professional lawyers generally
excluded but also technical legal argumentation was frowned upon.").
30
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 323.
3 E.g., DEFLIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 81 ("By decreasing the risk of opportunistic behavior,
smart contracts open up new avenues for commercial relationships, potentially facilitating an
increasing range of economic activities between untrusting parties.. . . When entering into an
arrangement involving a smart contract, parties only need to trust that the code accurately
memorializes their intent and that the nodes responsible for maintaining the network will properly
execute the smart contract code.").
32 This justification focuses on the underlying need for boilerplate, rather than analyzing the goals a
particular seller may have in drafting boilerplate. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of
Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts:Strategic Imposition of TransactionCosts, Segmentation
ofConsumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 983, 986-87 (2006) (noting four ways
in which drafters may use boilerplate to achieve goals: (1) to segment customers, (2) to stabilize
cartels, (3) to deceive customers, and (4) to signal non-negotiability of contract terms). In
Grimmelmann, supra note 10, at 2, the argument is that "[s]mart contracts do not eliminate
ambiguity-they hide it." In our view, they increase incentive to understand and deal with ambiguity
at the drafting stage rather than relying on dispute resolution mechanisms after drafting.
3 Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REv.
857, 864 (2006) ("[F]irms and individual consumers and employees do not bargain over standardform terms, they actively bargain in the shadow of those terms.").
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smart contracts is a digital-appearing handshake, combining the idea of digital
34
efficiencies with low-distance contractual exchange.
At the same time, the nature of code itself may tend towards obfuscation,
and so for smart contracts to enhance agreement, parties must have sufficient
incentive to actually understand code. This movement also risks ignoring the
doctrinal wisdom developed through centuries of common lawmaking-a body of
knowledge slowly evolved in response to real-life dilemmas as judges struggled to
enforce bargains. 3 5 For example, the benefits from reducing contractual distance
between parties risks re-adopting the injustice of sealed instruments. An inherent
feature of smart contracts is their adherence to code-a digital writing that
executes a series of steps the same way, every time. The nature of the blockchain
makes this requirement rigid: a smart contract housed on a blockchain must be
precisely the same on every node of the chain, or else the blockchain will be
brought into disagreement with itself. Because of this, smart contracts lack the
36
possibility of acting on fuzzy logic or matching imprecise states of the world.
Contracts that execute automatically regardless of the state of the world (absent
information from oracles, which must push the same information to all nodes on
the blockchain) risk acting remarkably similar to the seal on a historical instrument,
enforcing an agreement as code executes regardless of principles of equity.
Unreservedly embracing a contracting system that potentially ignores this history
by shouting the praises of self-executing bargains should give us pause, especially
37
as the law policing even traditional form contracts remains controversial.
34 See Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology that Will Replace Lawyers,

BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/smart-contracts/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019),
(representing smart contracts as two hands emerging from a digital-appearing background, shaking).
At the same time, these digital representations of legal relationships face the same problem as digital
representations of human relationships in social media. Social networks can facilitate exchange of
ideas and information among peer groups, but are at the same time often impersonal, giving
sometimes the veneer of sociality at the cost of face-to-face human interaction. Blockchain-based
contracting can facilitate exchange among many parties without intermediaries, lowering contractual
distance between parties, but does so without the human interaction that characterized historical lowdistance contracts. As with blockchain itself, smart contracting enables the sociality of the market
whether the parties would naturally engage in trusting behavior or not. See Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel
T. A. Croson & Robyn M. Dawes, Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross- Cultural
Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange, 108 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 168, 170, 200
(2002) (examining cooperation among "neighbors" and "strangers" in various cultural settings and
finding that trusting behavior declined significantly when moving from neighbors to strangers).
3s See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140.
36 Smart contracts can reference the outside world, but must do so through an "oracle," a source of
outside information that pushes the same outside information to each node on the chain at the same
time.
3 See infra the quotations heading the introduction, showing fundamental disagreement as to the
scope of what code can or should accomplish; Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1142 ("As a result of a
largely unconscious paradigm slip in contract law, many courts and scholars now assume that all
boilerplate text contributes 'terms' to a 'contract' in largely unproblematic ways akin to the simpler
uses of language to form contracts in 1883. They assume that pseudo-contractual text should be
enforced as 'contract' with minimal requirements of 'assent,' unless there is some standard contract
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The remainder of this Article reconciles these costs and benefits of smart
adhesion contracts. The next section provides background on blockchain
technology generally, and the following section describes the evolution of contract
as technology moves toward blockchains. Examples from the environmental
public goods and film industry then illustrate smart contracts in the wild. The
fourth section uses an economic transactions-cost framework comparing
traditional versus smart bespoke contracts, template contracts, and adhesion
contracts, illustrating the interplay of intermediaries, externalities, and transactions
costs with contractual distance. The final section offers suggestions for how courts
and parties might approach smart contracting to maximize the gains from large
blockchain-enabled contractual surplus. 3 8
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE AND CONTRACTUAL
DISTANCE
A. "But We Shook on It"-Relationship-Based Contracting
The existence of contract law, that is, the presence of a legal regime which
will enforce voluntary private obligations, likely began with relationship-based
exchanges. 3 9 Gift-giving, outcasting the dishonorable and religious conceptions of
promise and obligation governed exchange, identifying the exchange with the
social identity of the parties involved. As the common law developed, English
legal thinking evolved a set of formal rules to govern exchange of value,
particularly as pertaining to the creditor-debtor relationship. 40 In the medieval era,
what we would term contract law hinged on the formality of sealed instruments. 41
A seal was a piece of wax imprinted with a symbol, equivalent in use to a modern
42
signature, that was affixed to the physical document with the written agreement.
Absent allegations such as forgery, the presence of a seal made a bargain
enforceable, even against arguments going to the heart of the modern assent theory

law obstacle to enforcement arising from something like illegality or unconscionability. This is to
treat pseudo-contract as contract without adequate reflection. A major noncontractual intrusion into
the traditional sphere of contract law and modem market activity has gone largely unrecognized; or,
at least, the full depths and problematic nature ofthe intervention have escaped widespread notice.").
38

If boilerplate is named after the thick metal shielding passengers from steamboat boilers, then

smart contracts can potentially replace the boiler with a digital engine, all parts accessible from the
outside, without need of protective shielding.
39
See, e.g., MAUSS, supra note 255, at 70.
40 See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 311.
41 See A. W. B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 L. QUART. REV. 392
(1966) ("Far and away the majority of actions on contracts brought in the common law courts in

medieval times were actions of debt sur obligation; in such actions the plaintiff had to produce a
sealed instrument whereby the defendant had acknowledged himself to the debtor of the plaintiff.")
(quoted in LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 2828, at 321).
42 d.
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43
of contract, such as fraud, or to equitable principles like impossibility. Thus, the
44
phrase "seal the deal" was good legal advice.
As Chancery developed in response to inequities arising from the common
law, it attacked the fixation of the common law on seals, giving relief to debtors
from creditors seeking double payment from those who had paid but not complied
with the formalities of the seal. 4 5 Equitable principles entered contract law, and
through the eighteenth century the law centered on the fairness or justice of an
exchange.i During the nineteenth century, the modem doctrine of contractcentering on a meeting of the minds-developed, leaving the central idea of
fairness and adopting the view that so long as consideration was exchanged
47
voluntarily, courts would not question the underlying justice of the exchange.
With this doctrinal change focusing on the wills of the parties, the formality of the
seal graduallz left common use, although it lives on in practices such as today's
In parallel, much of the commercial life of Europe and England
notary seal.
different legal system. The law merchant governed commercial
a
much
involved
exchanges without great formality or the use of professional attorneys, applying
49
quick equitable principles to solve problems with exchange.
Despite these doctrinal legal changes over the centuries, the public
conception of contracts retains its roots of identity, honor, and community. The
50
deep cultural significance of the handshake deal and its breach illustrates this.

4' LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 288, at 322 ("Seal or record was conclusive on questions of liability,

and accordingly, at common law the defenses of 'fraud, failure of consideration, and accord and
satisfaction were not pleadable ... "') (quoting WILLIAM T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN
EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 23 (1914)). A sealed record even prevented a plea of discharge, unless the
discharge was evidenced by, e.g., another seal. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.

at 323.

164(1979) ("Modem contract law
46 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW

is fundamentally a creature of the nineteenth century. It arose both in England and America as a
reaction to a criticism ofthe medieval tradition of substantive justice that, surprisingly, had remained
a vital part ofeighteenth-century legal thought, especially in America. Only in the nineteenth century
did judges and jurists finally reject the longstanding belief that the justification of contractual
obligation is derived from the inherent justice or fairness of an exchange.").
47 See id. (there is some disagreement about the motivations for the change in contractual doctrine).
48 The notary's seal today is an embossment rather than a wax seal. See KarlaJ. Elliott, The Notarial
Seal - The Last Vestige ofNotaries Past, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 903, 903-904 (1998) (discussing
the role ofthe notary from medieval seisin ceremonies, at which parties symbolically exchanged dirt
or sticks in the presence of a notary to transfer land, to the present, arguing that state policies to
remove the seal requirement from notary usage are shortsighted, as notary seals are a "deterrent to

thievery and fraud").
49 See 3ERMAN, supra note 4, at 346-347.

'o The notion of a handshake sealing a bargain is frequent in business, e.g., Juliana Schroeder, Jane
Risen, Francesca Gino, & Michael I. Norton, Handshaking Promotes Cooperative Dealmaking

14-117,
May
30,
2014),
Sch.
Working
Paper
No.
(Harvard
Bus.
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-117_73032e86-d4d7-4b4b-ad5d5253e926853a.pdf and is frequently used in movies. E.g., DJANGO UNCHAINED (Columbia Pictures
2012) ("A deal ain't a deal until the two parties have shook hands. Even after all that paper signin',
don't mean s*** [if you don't s h

and."); PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN (Disney 2003)
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"But we shook on it" is used as a personal pejorative when a contracting party in
an arm-in-arm transaction breaches. By offering their hand, one might say, the
individual has committed their identity to the transaction in a way that ought to
bind them significantly. The breach is thus viewed as a personal affront, not just
an efficient commercial choice. 5 1The act of shaking hands may even affect how
an exchange is negotiated-in one study, the act of shaking hands at the beginning
of negotiation led to more cooperative behavior and improved joint outcomes
between parties. 52 In essence, the act of shaking hands was nonverbal behavior that
elicited real psychological differences in negotiation, such as inducing positive
emotions and prosociality.5 3
B. Contracts of Adhesion
As technology changed to allow form contracting with the advent of
printing and copying, adhesion contracts rather than handshakes became the
contractual norm. Large enterprises found it beneficial to draft lengthy contractual
terms, covering many eventualities, which would be offered to consumers of their
goods or services on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without negotiation. The fixed costs
of drafting such an agreement would be high, but, once spread over thousands of
consumers, could be an efficient way for the enterprise to control many of the terms
of a bargain, capturing much of the contractual surplus that would otherwise be
split more evenly through negotiation. Consumers facing these contracts rarely
find it rational to peruse their terms, as the hour to read the fine print on a small
consumer contract largely exceeds the benefits from understanding the trms,
especially if every other provider of such goods or services will likely have a
similar contract. Trusting that a loud complaint to a customer service
representative will likely solve many of the possible problems with the contract,
the consumer rationally signs without understanding the terms of the agreement.

(finalizing an "accord" with a handshake); THE EMPEROR'S NEWGRoovE (Disney 2000) (sealing an
agreement with a handshake, which when one party breaks, the other party responds with "But we
shook on it."); HOUSE, Season 1:19 (Fox 2004) (shaking hands to agree on returning to work in
exchange for a date). Whether these depictions provide useful legal guidance for individuals is
debatable. Rick Smith, Here's Why Hollywood Should Kiss the Handshake Deal Goodbye, 23 Lov.
L.A. ENrr. L. REv. 503 (2003) (arguing the popular portrayal of handshakes as creating legal
obligations is misguided).
51 In a modem contracting regime, handshakes provide decidedly mixed signals. They might be
evidence that offer has met acceptance and a bargain formed, or they might rather be a social nicety

to conclude anegotiating session. See, e.g., Rennickv. O.P.T.I.O.N Care, 77 F.3d 309, 314 (9th Cir.
1996) ("Handshakes are significant. When people shake hands, it means something, but several
meanings are possible."); PARKS AND REc6:6 (NBC 2013) (concluding "I think we have a deal" and
shaking hands after reaching a tentative agreement to sell Rent A Swag) (emphasis added).
52 Schroeder et al., supra note 50.
s 1d. at 24.
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C. Smart Contracts Housed on a Blockchain Ledger
A "smart" contract represents a further evolution of contract law in
response to technological changes. At heart, a smart contract is one in which part
of a contract or the entire contract is encoded and executed automatically via
54
mechanical means or computer code. The classic example of a rather simple
smart contract is a vending machine. Coin is inserted, a selection made, and a
snack delivered. 5 6 The action executes without an intermediary or two face-to-face
parties, mediated by the technology of the vending machine. More advanced smart
contracts have lines of computer code executed by a digital machine, making the
57
code of the contract final and immutable. Traditionally a contract could be
perceived as an agreement plus its surrounding law.ss For example, for sale of
goods, the Uniform Commercial Code specifically denotes that an "'Agreement',
as distinguished from 'contract', means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found
in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . ."59 In contrast, "'Contract',
as distinguished from 'agreement', means the total legal obligation that results
from the parties' agreement as determined by the Uniform Commercial Code as
60
To the agreement and its
supplemented by any other applicable laws."
as an essential aspect of the
itself
code
the
add
contracts
surrounding law, smart
The first digital contract may have resulted from the Berlin Airlift, as the U.S. Army developed a
digital manifest system. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 72-88. Grimmelmann, supra
note 10, at 4 defines a smart contract as "a technical obligation based on a formal-language
54

instrument" Technical obligations are enforced by a system rather than being enforced in case of

breach. Id. at 3.
See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality ofSmart Contracts, I GEORGETOWN L. TECH. REV. 305,
306, 315-316 (2017) (discussing vending machine as smart contract).
5

Of course, vending machines may sell more than junk food. E.g., Marianne Holman Prescott,
#LightTheWorld Goes Global with New Giving Machines in New York, London, Philippines, The
56

Church

of

Jesus

Christ

of

Latter-day

Saints

30,

(Nov.

2018),

https://www.Ids.org/church/news/lighttheworld-goes-global-with-new-giving-machines-in-new-

york-london-philippines?lang-eng ("Whether it is purchasing a soccer ball, clean water, hygiene
supplies, or livestock, individuals and families around the world have the opportunity

to

#LightTheWorld again through the Church's giving machines available during the Christmas season.
... The machines will be available through the Christmas season and partner with global charities
such as CARE, UNICEF, WaterAid, Water for People, Eye Care 4 Kids, Utah Food Bank, and Utah
Refugee Connection.").
5

See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Persistence of"Dumb" Contracts, STANFORDJ.

OF

BLOCKCHAIN L.

& POL'Y (2019), https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/persistence-dumb-contracts.
8 There is a rich literature on the theoretical aspects of what comprises the parties' intent and what
role default law and background rules should play in contractual interpretation. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir,
The Inverted Hierarchy ofContract Interpretationand Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710,

1772 (1997) (noting "there is typically a gap between the common understanding and intentions of
the parties regarding the behavior expected of each of them, and the obligations laid down in the
formal contract."). To this distinction, smart contracts would add a third layer: the expression of the
parties through computer code itself.
UCC § 1-201(a)(3).
U
6oId.

§ 1-201(a)(12).
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agreement. There are two ways this can be done. First, the parties may use code to
express the entire agreement, so that the code becomes the integrated contract. 6 1
Second, the parties may use the code to supplement or execute part of a larger
agreement. The first might be referred to as a "code-only" contract, and the second
62
a "hybrid" contract. If the code imperfectly reflects the bargain the parties have
reached, yet the parties agree to be bound by the imperfect representation of their
agreement in code form, then the bargain, plus the code, plus surrounding law,
determine the total legal obligation of the parties. 63
While possible since the advent of modem technology, the creation of
blockchain technology has given smart contracts increased salience, expanding the
scope of their potential uses. Blockchain is a shared digital public ledger. Each
transaction in the ledger is recorded across the blockchain, iving the record
greater stability than centralized repositories of digital assets. Blockchain was
initially popularized after its implementation with the cryptocurrency Bitcoin.65
Bitcoin, and blockchain, represented a solution to the basic problem with creating
digital currency: reduplication. If one gives another a physical dollar bill, the giver
loses access to the bill. In contrast, if one emails another a piece of digital currency,
it is difficult to assure the recipient that the sender hasn't retained a copy. For
example, emailing a copy of this article does not destroy its presence on the
authors' hard drives. In this way, the non-rival nature of digital files makes the
creation of digital coin problematic. Bitcoin attempted to solve this problem
through blockchain-the shared ledger records each transfer of coin, solving the
reduplication problem, and the existence of the ledger across multiple servers
provides heightened assurance to owners that the ledger is secure.6 6
The digital ledger accomplishes this through creating chained series of
blocks (hence, "block"-"chain"), that house records of transactions. In one
approach, the process of creating a new block in the chain relies on certain
computational math defined during the initial implementation of the blockchain.6 7
6 1Levi & Lipton, supra note
9.
62 By hybrid, we mean a contract

in which the code serves an ancillary purpose to a written agreement,
not hybrid functionality between various types of smart contracts, such as ERC20 and ERC223
contracts.
See Omar
MK,
Hybrid Smart Contracts, MEDiuM
(Jan.
2,
2018),
https://medium.com/hybrid-smart-contracts/hybrid-smart-contracts-ff963db9c702.
63 See Lipshaw, supra note 57 ("The smartest contracts, as with cryptocurrencies, are the deal. They
exist and operate without need for any input from the outside or interpretation of the rules that
embody them. But to the extent that the once dumb but increasingly smart contract maps rather than
is the deal, it will need to fine tune and fix at the outset the rules that would apply in every relevant
future contingency.").
64See FLIPPI& WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 33-71.
65 See Kiviat,supra note 5, at 570-573.
66As of this writing, in the ten years since the creation of Bitcoin no one
has been able tohack the

blockchain protocol.

67 Another, less-implemented approach is to only rely on trusted miners to create blocks.
This limits

the possible scope of the blockchain to a trusted pool of individuals. See POA Network, Proofof
Authbrity: Consensus Model with Identity at Stake, MEDIUM (Nov.
11,
https://medium.com/poa-network/proof-of-authority-consensus-model-with-identity-at-stake-

2017),
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To add a block to the chain, a user (or pooled group of users) must solve or prove
a programmer-defined algorithm in order to validate the transaction. This is often
referred to as "mining", a fitting term, because it ties trust and credibility to the
real-world asset of computing power. When first establishing a new blockchain,
the creator can implement various types of computational proofs. The most
common are "proof of work" and "proof of stake." Although proof of work and
proof of stake techniques are both widely used among blockchain developers, each
68
technique has both great benefits and certain drawbacks.
Proof of work incentivizes creation of blocks by rewarding the blocks'
creators with small amounts ofthe currency housed on the chain.69 First, the ledger
transactions carry a small fee, which the miner collects as incentive for creating
the block. Transactions with a greater transaction fee are prioritized, so they are
housed on blocks before transactions with a lower fee. A user seeking to enter a
transaction on the chain can choose which amount to pay the miner, which gives
miners greater incentive to store those transactions on blocks. Second, creating the
block may come with a direct currency reward. Miners can run the blockchain's
algorithm to try and solve this equation first, and the miner who solves the problem
70
receives a part of the mined coin in addition to the transaction fees.
To understand the logic, consider a group of students taking a math test
with a reward for first correct response. The teacher explains that only the student
providing the correct answer and the steps to provide proof will receive an award.
The competition disincentives group manipulation, and the requirement to show
proof prevents the students from cheating with answer sheets. There are many
advantages to utilizing proof of work, such as reduced vulnerability to attacks as a
result of its decentralized nature.71 The decentralized system incentivizes miners
to assist in the creation of new blocks and disincentives actions that try to
manipulate the chain. At the same time, opponents argue that the resources spent
on mining blocks poses significant societal disadvantage. For example, miners of
Bitcoin use around 22 terawatt-hours of electricity every year, which, by
72
comparison, is the same as that of a small nation. There also tends to be a
diminishing marginal return on mining block because, as more blocks are added to
7
a blockchain protocol, the reward the miner receives is lower. This poses a
problem for the future sustainability of blockchain technologies. There has also
d5bdl5463256.

68 See Ameer Rosic, Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic Mining Guide, BLOCKGEEKS

https://blockgecks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
69Id.
7o id.

71id.
72 The Madness of Crowds, ECONOMIST 75 (Mar. 30, 2019) (comparing the energy usage to the
country of Romania); G.F., Why Bilcoin Uses So Much Energy, ECONOMIST (July 9, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/09/why-bitcoin-uses-so-much-energy
(comparing the energy usage to the country ofIreland).

7 Laws ofsupply and demand dictate that over time the reward for mining blocks should be equal to
the transaction fees awarded to the miner.
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been rising concern about the centralization of mining power. The rise of 'crypto
mining farms' is similar to the Gold Rush of the 1850s, with investors pouring in
large amounts of capital to establish new farms around the world.7 4 Smallerminers
have voiced concern with the increasing costs of GPUs that now present a possible
barrier to entry into the crypto market.
With these disadvantages of proof of work in mind, some blockchains are
turning to proof of stake. Simply put, the proof of stake algorithm requires miners
to stake their tokens on the creation of a new block. If selected to validate the block,
in addition to transaction fees, the miner receives a reward. Proof of stake has a
deterministic winner resulting in the new block-the more stake a miner puts in,
the higher the chance of reward. At the same time, there is a high degree of chance
and randomization added to the system to ensure that not only the most successful
miners on the system continue to get richer. This system gives proof of stake the
ability to reduce the risk of consolidation of mining power. Proof of stake is similar
to a lottery system, so to continue the student example, in this case the teacher
randomly (without bias) chooses to give an A to a student; however, students could
"stake" previous grades to increase the chance of receiving another A. However,
if it was discovered that the teacher was actually biased in her distribution of the
grade, the student that staked their grades would lose every grade they put up and
it would be distributed among all the other students.
Finally, blockchains differ in the structure and capabilities. Although
much of the public eye has been on the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, more companies
have chosen to utilize Ethereum to develop their blockchain-based smart contracts
applications. 7 6In technical terms, this is because Bitcoin is "Turing incomplete"
while Ethereum is "Turing complete," making them fundamentally different. A
Turing complete language is a system that could compute any programed.code
given that it had unlimited memory and time. Ethereum is the most popular Turing
complete contracting language, but there are many options. Quorum, Wanchain,
Zen, Rootstock, Qtum, and other platforms employ variations on privacy,
78
payments to house transactions, or faster and safer code execution. This Turing
complete attribute gives developers on the Ethereum Virtual Machine the ability
74 Julia Magas, Top Five Biggest Crypto Mining Areas, COINTELEGRAPH (June 23, 2018),

https://cointelegraph.com/news/top-five-biggest-crypto-mining-areas-which-farms-are-pushingforward-the-new-gold-rush.
7 See Lester Coleman, Declining ProfitabilityforNew Miners Threatens Bitcoin Decentralization,
CNN (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.ccn.com/declining-profitability-for-new-miners-threatensbitcoin-decentralization.
76 See Neil Ainger, Bigger than Bitcoin? EnterpriseEthereum Alliance Grows in Size, CNBC (May
24, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/23/bigger-than-bitcoin-enterprise-ethereum-alliance-

grows-in-size.html.
" Vasa, ContractPedia:An Encyclopedia of40+ Smart ContractPlatforms, HACKERNOON (July 18,

2018),
https://hackernoon.com/contractpedia-an-encyclopedia-of-40-smart-contract-platforms4867f66dale5 (in more technical terms, Etherereum is Turing "Total" as all contracts must
terminate).
78 id.
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to use programing techniques such as loops and if statements, making it a useful
blockchain for implementing smart contracts. On the other hand, the Bitcoin
developers have chosen to remove this feature in the Bitcoin blockchain; therefore,
Bitcoin's main functionality is limited predominantly to distributing currency. At
the same time, with Turing completeness, a program could run forever (such as an
infinite loop), and in this way users could attack the system with unnecessary lines
of code, essentially causing the blockchain to become stuck. Bitcoin solves this
problem by removing the Turing complete aspect while Ethereum has instead
opted to implement an operation fee known as "gas." Users would need to pay for
lines of code to be executed, essentially paying for computing power; this feature
assists in preventing denial of service attacks. This unique aspect of Ethereum is
one of the main reasons why so many smart contract developers have chosen this
platform over the hundreds of other options.7 9
Contracts housed on Ethereum are written in Solidity, a language written
to execute on the blockchain.8 0 To make concrete what this looks like, consider
" is perhaps the simplest possible smart
two exhibits. Exhibit I "Contract
"contract" (in the language of Ethereum, any code housed on the chain is a
"contract" whether or not it entails an exchange of value the law would recognize
as contractual). 8 It simply sets a variable to a value (the name of the article), then
returns it. The entire code follows:
Exhibit 1 "Contract 1"
pragma solidity >=0.4.22 <0.6.0;
contract Examplel {
function getTheName() public view returns (bytes32 TheName)

{
TheName = "Should Code Be Law?";

}
}
The code is very simple. The first line tells the compiler which version of Solidity
will work (Solidity is quite version-sensitive, which means much older code found
online needs to be updated before it will work with the current compiler.) The
second begins a contract called Examplel, which contains one function, called
82
getTheName. This function simply returns the name of this Article. This contract
See id. (Ethercum is not the only Turing-complete blockchain).
16.
81 For example, see Ethereum's Github page, which notes that "[smart contracts are programs that
are executed inside a peer-to-peer network where nobody has special authority over the execution
and thus they allow to implement tokens of value, ownership, voting and other kinds of logics." See
GITHUB,
Language,
Programming
Contract-Oriented
the
Solidity,
https://github.com/ethereum/solidity (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
82
As
Ethereum
only
handles
bytes,
it
returns
a
hexadecimal
number
7

80 See SOLIDITY, supra note
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is housed on the Ethereum Rinkeby test network-a blockchain used to test
applications at reduced cost before deploying to the full blockchain-where the
value of the variable (the article name) is registered.8 3 Ethereum currently runs
three test networks, each named after subway stations in Stockholm. It costs
0.000102 Ether, or about $0.01 to deploy on the blockchain.8
To go a step further, Exhibit 2 "Contract 2" illustrates creating a simple
token, which could act as the value exchanged in a legally-cognizable contract.
Given the institutional affiliation of the authors at the time of writing, "TruCoin"
seemed an apt token to create, with symbol "TRCN." 8 The following gives an
outline of the code.8 6
Exhibit 2 "Contract 2, Code Outline"

contract TokenERC20{
constructor(

)public{
totalSupply = initialSupply * 10 ** uint256(decimals);
balanceOf[msg.sender] = totalSupply;
name = tokenName;
symbol = tokenSymbol;

}
(0x53686f756c6420436f6465204265204c61773f0000000000000000000000000)
which can be
converted into a string. See Hex to String (Hex to Text), CODE BEAUTIFY,
https://codebeautify.org/hex-string-converter (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
83 The contract address is Ox9473f42a4917Dbf09354828599243046961809bF. It can be accessed
through Etherscan's Rinkeby registry at rinkeby.etherscan.io (To access the contract, search for the
contract address. Click on Code, then "Switch to Opcodes View." The article name follows "PUSH
32"). In practical terms, creating a Rinkeby contract first requires acquiring Rinkeby Ether. Rinkeby
grants ether based on a Proof of Authority concept. Ether is available from a faucet at
https://faucet.rinkeby.io/. There, a hexadecimal number can be copied and posted to a public social
network (Google+, Twitter, or Facebook), to validated that a real person is requesting Ether. The link
to the post is then copied and pasted into the faucet, which grants the poster a small quantity of Ether.
8 Because the contract is deployed on a test network, there is no actual exchange to U.S. dollars, as
there would be if housed on the main Ethereum network.
85
See Token
TruCoin,
RINKEBY
ETHERSCAN
(last
visited
Jan. 24,
2019),
https://rinkeby.etherscan.io/token/0x42428e95e3833be80116bd419af24e6ac
dfa7168 (TruCoin is housed on the Rinkeby test network).
86 Ellipses indicate code omitted for space. The contract was created by modifying code available at
Ethereum, Create Your Own Crypto-Currency with Ethereum, ETHEREUM (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.ethereum.org/token (giving code to create a minimum viable token and an ERC-20
token); see also Marcus Molchany, The Easiest Way to Deploy Smart Contracts on Ethereum,
MEDIUM (Jan. 29, 2018), https://medium.com/@marcusmolchany/the-easiest-way-to-deploy-smartcontracts-on-ethereum-65f69ac9a627 (describing the process of smart contract creation through
installing Metamask, and so on).
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function transfer(...) public returns (bool success){
...
}
function transferFrom(...) public returns (bool success){
function burn(uint256

value) public returns (bool success){

}
This code creates an ERC-20 token, a token created via smart contract and
housed on the Ethereum network, which satisfies six basic protocols. The token
must (1) create a total supply, (2) track balances in accounts, (3) be able to transfer
from the supply and (4) between accounts, (5) approve (check whether a
transaction stays within the total number of tokens), and (6) check allowances
7
(prohibiting transfer if the user's account has an insufficient balance). In the code
outline above, the space designated "constructor" sets up the basic parameters of
the token, such as creating the initial supply, setting up a name, and giving a
symbol. The code outlined then creates space to house the transfer functions (3)
and (4). The "bum" function at the end allows tokens to be removed from the
system.
While TruCoin was created for illustrative purposes, tying the token to
real-world assets would enable it to act as a medium of exchange or store of value
88
in the manner of other cryptocurrencies. Consider how the use of TruCoin can
facilitate contracting without intermediaries. If the authors of this paper wished to
exchange one author's rights to a digital movie for the other's TruCoin, but
mistrusted the rights owner to deliver after payment, one solution would be to use
a third party. The third party would hold the buyer's TruCoin, inform the seller of
the delivery of the coin, and the seller would then deliver the movie. With the
movie delivered, the third party would deliver the price to the buyer. The advantage
of the smart contract is to eliminate the need for the intermediary. If the authors

8

E.g.,

Maxwell

William,

ERC-20 Tokens,

Explained, COINTELEGRAPH

(May

12,

2018),

https://cointelegraph.com/explained/erc-20-tokens-explained.
8For the reader unfamiliar with the mechanics of smart contract creation, the code creating the
contract is entered on an Ethereum wallet linked to the correct network. Once the code is entered, it
compiles, and the contract can be executed. As set up here, the interface asks for the initial supply,
the name of the token, and a symbol. Once entered, the contract is submitted to the network and the
creator pays a gas price, with a higher gas price meaning the contract is housed on a node more

quickly. Using the required gas, the contract is then distributed across the nodes housing the
blockchain and become available to interact with publicly. The account creating the contract in this
case retains an administrative page inside the wallet which allows access to the contractual functions,
such as transferFrom (giving tokens to wallets) and burn (destroying tokens). For an illustration of
this process with screenshots, see L8 Yen Thanh, [ETHER101] Lesson 2: Create a Simple Token
2017),
26,
(Nov.
MEDIUM
Ethereum,
with
(Cryptocurrency)
https://medium.com/@yenthanh/etherl01-lession-2-create-a-simple-token-cryptocurrency-withethereum-c6c2I fde2ea2; Ld Yen Thanh, IE771ER/01]Lesson3: Createa Real Token in Production
with Ethereum, MEDIUM (Dec. 10, 2017), https://medium.com/@yenthanh/etherl01-lession-3-

create-a-real-token-in-production-with-ethereum-

66 65

f

1091c3b.
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create a smart contract, the buyer can fund the sales price to the contract itself,
storing the value in TruCoin at the contract address. At that point, the movie is
delivered, the buyer confirms the delivery, and the contract releases the funds. 89
The contract acts as a type of digital agent, using coded logic to accomplish what
a natural person might do in the traditional contractual setting.
D. Blockehain-Based Dispute Resolution
While smart contracts may simply carry out part of an otherwise ordinary
contractual exchange and be subject to usual civil procedure in case of breach,
certain smart contracting parties may wish to avoid the traditional legal system.
These kinds of deals face a problem: what happens in case of breach? Traditional,
natural-language contracts rely on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in
case the contract is not executed; generally arbitration or the civil justice system.
The parties engage through these mechanisms, and some sort of remedy such as
expectation damages is given the aggrieved. This ability to let courts or arbitrators
sort things out gives tremendous efficiency to contractual drafting-many unlikely
scenarios in bespoke contracts are not worth the time to draft around, as the cost
of drafting contingency plans exceeds the expected value of addressing the
unlikely harm. 90 Rather, if they occur, the body of contract law essentially fills in
the blanks. In sales contracts, the UCC accomplishes this, and in other contracts,
common law rules like impossibility, mistake, and fraud do the same.91
Parties expressing their complete wishes via smart contract, who wish to
avoid the legal system, face difficulty at this stage. One solution is to host the
dispute resolution mechanism on the blockchain. Two of the larger contenders in
this space are Kleros and OpenCourt. Kleros attempts to bring justice to smart
contracts by leveraging the same economic principles that underlie blockchain
itself.92 Anonymous jurors handed a dispute are given incentives to reach the same
89 For a technical representation of this with code, see Michael Rice, Introducing a New Project:A
Collection of Legal, Solidity Based Smart Contracts, MEDIUM (May 8, 2018),
https://medium.com/@michaelriceLE/introducing-a-new-project-a-collection-of-legal-soliditybased-smart-contracts-6d6b534el93. For an extended discussion ofthe mechanics and economics of
blockchain-based exchange, see Gans, supra note 5.
9 Expected value is the amount of the harm multiplied by its probability. Thus, even a very large
harm that is very unlikely may not be worth the time in cost of negotiating and drafting to address in
a contract.
91 For the implications of smart contracts on the UCC, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the

Uniform Commercial Code, 24 UNIv. MiAM L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2015); Stephen M. McJohn, The
Commercial Law ofBitcoin and Blockchain Transactions(Suffolk University Law School Research

Paper No. 16-13, 2016).
92 For a critique of these systems, see Sklaroff, supra note 5, at 301 ("However, the decentralized
nature of these systems ensures that they will be essentially useless in managing the high costs of
smart contracting. By shifting dispute resolution to an online system that relies on an everchanging,
unpredictable, unaccountable, and opaque group of decisionmakers, decentralized adjudication
cannot generte contract 'public goods' like performance standards, which emerge through the stable
application of interpretation rules by courts. . . . In these decentralized resolution systems, parties
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conclusion as other jurors, essentially replicating the consensus requirement at the
heart of blockchain itself. Kleros adjudication can be invoked in the code, unifying
the dispute resolution mechanism with the contract code. In contrast, OpenCourt
relies on arbitrators. When invoking the OpenCourt protocol in their code, the coin
at issue is forwarded to a virtual escrow account, which holds the funds until an
OpenCourt arbitrator, presumably unbiased and learned in principles of virtual
93
exchange, decides the matter.
The development of decentralized, anonymous dispute resolution systems
brings the development of contract law back to a significant aspect of its historical
roots in the law merchant. 9 4 The contracting process and dispute resolution all
happen through decentralized exchange, without the need to appeal to any one
jurisdiction's courts. The substantive law of contract or the desired dispute
resolution steps to be applied by a Kleros jury or OpenCourt arbitrator could be
specified in the contract itself.
E. Contractual "Distance"
The history of contract law can be characterized as increasingly facilitating
exchange between ever-more remote parties. First, sealed documents provided a
way to enforce long-distance exchanges with an adjudicator unfamiliar with the
contracting parties, then adhesion contracts enabled parties with no personal
contact to enter into complex bargains en masse. Blockchain-based smart contracts
now let remote parties enter into auto-executing exchanges unmediated by
traditional court systems. In other words, the long arc of contract law has been to
facilitate exchanges at greater "distance" between the parties as technology
evolved. 9 5 We use the term "contractual distance" to indicate the extent to which
actual agreement between the ultimate initiator and acceptor of an exchange takes
place. It is defined as the number of intermediate parties needed to accomplish an
exchange of value, weighted by the rational level of actual agreement between the
parties at each step of the exchange. Contractual distance is related to the term
"social distance," which indicates the extent to which two people find themselves

cannot know how to craft their arguments to maximize success or minimize risk."). We are more
sanguine about its possibilities, due to the historic roots of contract in precisely this kind of
adjudication, and the fact that multiple dispute resolution mechanisms are possible, so that parties
may tailor it to their needs.
9 OpenLaw, Legally Enforceable Blocchain-Based Arbiration, CONSENSYS (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://media-consensys.net/opencourt-legally-enforceable-blockchain-based-arbitration-

3d7147dbb56f.
94 For discussion ofblockchain anonymity, see Sklaroff,supra note 5, at 295.
9" See supra note 20 (discussing the literature on "social distance" versus "contractual distance"
between parties).
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demographically and culturally similar to each other but attempts to convey the
idea of ultimate agreement at the beginning and end of a contract-based exchange.
A garage-sale exchange has very low contractual distance. It requires no
intermediaries, so buyer and seller are connected directly, and the terms are
generally completely understood by the parties. A small amount of cash is
exchanged for a good sold as is, perhaps after some negotiation. Marriage, so far
as it can be understood as a contract, similarly has low distance. Unless the
marriage is arranged, the parties bargain with each other to begin their joint lives
and generally understand the implications of entering into a new social relationship
with each other. 9 6 Contracts embedded in a meaningful social context outside
family ties might also have low contractual distance, as agreements are made
relying on well-understood social pressures to police eventualities rather than form
contracting. 97
In contrast, contracts of adhesion are characterized by large contractual
distance. In a typical consumer adhesion contract, the consumer confronts a
faceless behemoth with take-it-or-leave-it terms. The contract has no social context
and what negotiating takes place occurs over an ex post customer-service hotline,
not a draft of a contract.98 The consumer typically understands the core nature of
the bargain (e.g., exchanging money for cell phone service), but little of the
boilerplate text given them, such as arbitration provisions or limitations on
liability. The exchange might not have intermediaries, but the lack of actual
agreement makes it a high-distance exchange. A multilevel exchange of value,
requiring many boilerplated-intermediate contracts, such as the film example in
the Introduction, represents extremely high contractual distance. 9 9
In general, contract law developed doctrines responding to low-distance
situations. The nature of offer and acceptance presupposes that parties come to
actual agreement, not a sham agreement a consumer clicks on pretending to have
96 See Markovits, supra note 222, at 1419.

For example, the Jewish diamond industry in New York embeds exchanges in a religious
community that self-polices. See Barak D. Richman, Community EnforcementofInformalContracts:
Jewish DiamondMerchants in New York 11 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ.
&

9

Bus. Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002) ("[T]his paper contends that the diamond industry found its
way to Jewish communities because of efficiency considerations, and since the traditional social
structure remains intact in New York's ultra-Orthodox communities, an understanding of what
generates their current competitive advantage can also serve to explain Jewish merchants' historical
predominance in the diamond industry.").
Although adhesion contracts are typically thought of as take-it-or-leave-it, one can conceive of
adhesion contracts as being negotiated in a larger societal sense by competitive pressures or through
the ability to vary contractual terms through customer service negotiations. See Johnston, supra note
33, at 858 ("[R]ather than precluding bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact
facilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance ofcooperative

relationships between firms and their customers.... In practice, acting through its agents, a firm will
often provide benefits to consumers who complain beyond those that its standard form obligates it to

provide .....").
See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1182 (if the boilerplate is accepted by sophisticated parties, a

likely different set of incentives applies).
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read pages and pages of text. Technology then enabled higher distance exchanges.
An extensive law review literature examines the shortcoming of these highdistance contracts, going so far as to call such contracts "pseudo-contracts"
00
because they are entered into without actual agreement.o By resolving trust issues
through blockchain technology rather than costly intermediaries, smart contracts
shorten the chain of parties needed to effectuate exchanges of value. Because code
will execute automatically as parties fulfill the conditional exchanges built into the
code, there is less incentive for boilerplate to be drafted to cover the many ways
the contract could go wrong, more incentive to resolve ambiguity in drafting, and
greater incentive for the consumer to understand the exchanges embodied in
contractual code.' 0
III. SMART CONTRACT APPLICATIONS
A. Environmental Public Goods
With many comparing the advent of blockchain to the dawning of the
Internet, a broad number of industries are racing to implement them in some form.
Companies have begun to implement blockchain technology in industries from
03
digital voting,104
agriculture and food supply logistics,102 to copyright protection,
06
personal identification,o real estate and property transfers,1 and transportation
logistics.' 07 Most recently, JPMorgan became the first United States bank to

1142.
See Buchan, supra note 34. The nature of the blockchain itself was designed to overcome trust
issues in the maintenance of a public ledger, so it should not be surprising that it may help solve
00 Id. at

'01

contractual trust issues. Low contractual distance occurs regardless of whether high social distance
would otherwise hinder cooperative dealmaking.
102 Andrew Rossow, Why Walmart's Move to the Blockchain Could Do More than Prevent E. Coli
Outbreaks, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/09/25/why6
walmarts-move-to-the-blockchain-could-do-more-than-cure-e-coli-outbreaks/# 1cO2ad1100.
ABOVE THE LAW
Protection,
103 Tom Kulik, How Blockchain JustMay Transform Online Copyright
12, 2018), https://abovethclaw.com/2018/02/how-blockchain-just-may-transform-online(Feb.
copyright-protection/.
104 Phil Daian, Ian Miers, Oded Naor, & Ari Juels, Bribery-Resistant Voting Schemesfor Smart
Contracts, RESEARCH (Sept. 13, 2018), https://ethresear.ch/t/bribery-resistant-voting-schemes-forsmart-contracts/3354.
1os Zachary Diebold, Self-Sovereign Identity Using Smart Contracts on the Ethereum Blockchain,

2017),
(May
DUBLIN
UNiV.
DISSERTATION-2017-016.pdf.

https://scss.tcd.ie/publications/theses/diss/2017/TCD-SCSS-

106 The Purchase and Sale of Real Property on Ethereum, CONSENSYS (Apr. 24, 2018),
2 89 7
a b5.
https://media.consensys.neithe-purchase-and-sale-of-real-property-on-ethereum-55bdc
107 IlamidNach& RachidGhilal, Blockchain and Smart Contractsin the Logisticand Transportation
2018),
(Nov.
RESEARCHGATE
Industry,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319764963 Blockchain and Smart
ContractsintheLogisticandTransportation_1ndustryTheDemurrage and MaritimeTrade
Use Case.
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implement its own blockchain-based coin.108 This Section considers the presence
of blockchain and smart contracts in two major industries: the environmental goods
sector and the TV/film industry. These industries are particularly interesting from
a contracting perspective because they center around public goods-goods that are
difficult to exclude others from using, and which can be used by many
simultaneously.' 0 9The non-exclusive, non-rival nature of these goods makes them
ideal targets for entities to distribute property rights via fractionalized assets
embedded in adhesive smart contracts.
In the environmental sector, there are two major causes of market
inefficiencies: insufficiently developed property rights and high transaction
costs. 10 The emergence of blockchain-focused companies reduces contractual
distance between the producer and consumer, while enabling exchange of
fractionalized property rights. For example, Social Plastic is a charity organization
attempting to stop the flow of plastic into the ocean by utilizing a blockchain-based
application to incentivize recycling in developing countries. The organization has
set up collection centers around the world where people can trade used plastic in
exchange for currency and services. "By enabling the exchange of plastic for
money, items or Blockchain secured digital tokens, we reveal the value in plstic.
This empowers recycling ecosystems around the world and stops the flow of
plastic into our oceans. All while helping people living in poverty build better
futures.""' Another company called SolarCoin uses cryptocurrency to reward
producers of solar power with SolarCoin which can be traded for Bitcoin or cash."12
The goal of the company is to help encourage the installation of solar panels by
reducing the payback return time.113 Similarly, the company Electron has risen to
help individuals trade their surplus electricity to other consumers nearby through
the use of decentralized smart meters and smart contracts on a blockchain network.
The longer electricity travels from its initial creation, through electrical lines and
finally to its destination, the greater energy lost in the process. By enabling peerto-peer transactions, households that require extra electricity could engage in
transactions with households nearby with excess electricity, leading to less energy
loss compared to when all households rely solely on a central power source.
108 Son, supra note 8.

See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods

109

Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 980, 993 (discussing experimental evidence on public goods and
social pressure to not free-ride).
110

See Pedro Schwartz, Ronald Coase, the Unexpected Economist, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (Oct. 7,

2013), https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2013/SchwartzCoase.html
of the Coase Theorem and transaction cost analysis).
11

(discussing the history

What We Do, PLASTICBANK, https://www.plasticbank.com/what-we-do/#.XCOnO89KjuO

visited
Jan. 28, 2019).
112

(last

SolarCoin, SOLARCOIN, https://solarcoin.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
113 Current research by Paul Johnson, Columbia School of Business,
and Nick Gogerty, SolarCoin,
has found that the underlying interactive structures of SolarCoin are quite promising. Nich Gogerty
& Paul Johnson, Network Capital: Value of Currency Protocols Bitcoin & SolarCoin Cases in
Context(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3281845or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3281845.
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A platform called Aqua Rights utilizes the Ethereum blockchain and
smart contracts to better define and trade water rights.14 Ironically, water rights
are illiquid assets, and initial purchases of water require a large amount of upfront
capital. It is also quite difficult to establish agreements of tied ownership, but with
the creation of the AQUA token on the Ethereum blockchain, representing
ownership of water rights, this barrier to entry would be removed as buyers would
be able to pool initial capital or buy smaller fractional sections to water rights. This
tokenization also mitigates the illiquidity of water rights by introducing smart
contracts for greater exchangeability.
B. Blockchain and Blockbusters
Blockchain technology has the potential to transform the underlying
structure of how entertainment is funded and distributed. The platform Movie Coin
has been offered to help raise funds for production of new content through an initial
coin offering.'"5 The token would help raise initial funds and capital to produce
video content. Movies, TV series, or VR content would have their own tokens
which anyone could buy (e.g., a Game of Thrones Season 9 Coin, or a Zatanna
Coin). This token system would help finance content that failed to receive adequate
funding from a venture capitalist or a massive studio, yet still had public support.
Using the coin, the consumer would then be able to buy or rent films without the
need to pay an intermediary. Today, many contract deals are made solely through
film studios to a filmmaker or production company, but a platform like MovieCoin
enables the consumer to transact directly with the filmmaker, reducing the
contractual distance between seller and buyer. This decrease in contractual
distance would lead to greater efficiency, as content would become more reflective
of consumer preferences, leading to a potentially complete radicalization of how
consumers view their entertainment.
6
Breaker is a platform aimed at content production and hiring crew." The
platform utilizes the Ethereum protocol and Solidity to build smart contracts that
help connect filmmakers with crew members and other production related services
located near the area of a project. The peer-to-peer model of the application leads
to removal of intermediaries like studio executives, thus cutting costs significantly.
Since the contracts are stored on a blockchain, there is better traceability on what
members contributed to each part of the film, and the low contractual distance

"4 I)igitizing Water Rights: Creatinga New Tradeable Asset Class with Liquidity, AQUA RIGHTs,

https://aquarights.com/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
."

Hollywood

2.0:

The

Fintech Platform for the Entertainment Industry, MOVIECOIN,

https://movic.io/en/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (an initial coin offering is an exchange of real-world
currency for crypto-tokens of one sort or the other); see Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd. v. Alibabacoin
Found., No. 18-CV-2897 (JPO), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72282, at *72284 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2018)
(discussing initial coin offerings).
116

Welcome to Breaker, BREAKER, https://www.breaker.io/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
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between filmmaker and the crew member allow payouts to those crew members to
be executed more quickly and transparently.
A Swedish company called Cinezen Blockchained Entertainment has
teamed up with Slate Entertainment Group to start work on a transparent
blockchain-based Video on Demand Streaming Service platform.
The platform
would use Ethereum-based smart contracts to give content creators control to all
data on the titles they own; thus removing the complex process of royalty payouts.
Currently, filmmakers have no way of verifying third party royalty payouts, which
are at the mercy of the integrity of the company's executives. Because of this, some
companies fail to even acknowledge royalty payouts to content creators, especially
smaller creators. On the Cinezen platform each piece of content (film, TV episode,
web show, etc.) would be considered a smart asset, and every rental or sale
transaction would be stored on the blockchain, giving both the consumer and
supplier equal access to this information. The ability to make these transactions
without the need for a third party reflects a dramatic change for the industry." In
sum, and in our terminology, the first adopters of smart contracts represent
dramatic decreases in contractual distance between parties, removing
intermediaries and connecting producers and consumers more directly through
smart contract-enabled digital markets.
IV. A TRANSACTIONS-COST APPROACH TO SMART CONTRACTS
From a law and economics standpoint, the body of legal principles known
as contract law exists because of transactions costs.119 In a frictionless world in
which people with perfect information bargain costlessly to efficient outcomes, we
would have no need of the corpus of legal doctrines developed to handle the
friction inherent in exchanges.1 20 Examples of friction are the cost to research
117 Liz Shackleton, Sales Agents Including LevelK and Celsius Sign Up to New Blockchain
VOD

Platform, SCREENDAILY (Feb. 20,2018), https://www.screendaily.com/news/sales-agents-includinglevelk-and-celsius-sign-up-to-new-blockchain-vod-platform/5126846.article.
118"This is the first time in human history that we've been able to make a transaction without the
need ofa third party and that is an exciting part ofthe DNA ofthe technology itself." Ashley Turing,

of LiveTree ADEPT CEO, another Movie and TV Series funding and distribution application.
COINTELEGRAPH, Livetree ADEPT ICO To Announce A

Blockchain

Summit

London,

$10 Million Dollar Partnership In
https://cointelegraph.com/press-releases/livetree-adept-ico-to-

announce-a-I0-million-dollar-partnership-in-blockchain-summit-london(Mar.10,2018).
19

See, e.g., JANET TAi LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY 4 (1994)

("[M]ainstream

(neoclassical) theories of exchange implicitly assume a world with zero transaction costs. In such a
world, there is no role for exchange institutions such as money, middleman, contract law, . . . and

gift-exchange. The study of these exchange institutions has been relegated to subfields within
economics such as monetary theory or to sister disciplines of marketing theory, law, sociology, and
anthropology. But precisely because these institutions facilitate exchange via their role in
coordinating the activities of independent traders, and hence promoting order, they should be

amenable to economic analysis.").
120 Indeed, there would be no need for a legal order at all, other than one making property rights clear!
See Ronald Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECoN. 1 (1959); Thomas W.
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information pertaining to the contract, negotiation (perhaps with unequal
bargaining power), drafting of contractual text, drafting of smart contract code,
recording the transfer of assets, recovering damages for breach, and so forth. In a
theoretical Coasean framework without these costs, law would establish initial
property rights and then leave parties alone to reach efficient conclusions. Legal
solutions to fraud, mistake, impossibility, ambiguity, parol evidence, and so on,
would never have developed because they would not be needed. For example,
perfect information about all states of the world, combined with the ability to
costlessly draft, would mean every agreement would be completely integrated and
perfectly rendered to capture the will of the parties, doing away with the need for
evidentiary rules to resolve contractual incompleteness.
Thankfully for these authors and the legal profession, the real world is not
frictionless. Transactional attorneys owe their jobs to the efficiencies parties find
in paying third parties to negotiate and draft agreements. Litigators are employed
because parties cannot always bargain to perfect settlements absent counsel.121
These real-world costs are thus an instructive viewpoint from which to analyze
developments in contract law. When the potential gains from trade minus the
transaction costs involved in the exchange are positive, the exchange occurs.122
When intermediaries are involved, each intermediary must similarly find that the
gains from aiding the exchange exceed the costs in rendering aid.
The disruptive potential for smart contracts stems from the potential to
vastly reduce these transaction costs, thus enabling exchanges too costly to
otherwise occur.123 Particularly for creating and distributing fractionalized assets
of public goods, where the transaction costs required to involve traditional
intermediaries would otherwise be prohibitive, this opens up new possibilities for
exchange. Transaction costs in contracting are relevant in at least four stages of the
contracting process-during (1) negotiation, (2) drafting, including the cost of
coding for smart contracts, (3) performance, especially the costs to record and
24
transfer records of ownership, and (4) in case of breach.1

I lazlett, David Porter, & Vernon Smith, Radio Spectrum andthe DisruptiveClarityofRonald Coase,
Paper for Markets, Firms, and Property Rights: A Celebration of the Research of Ronald Coase,

Conference

at

the

University

of

Chicago

School

of

Law

(Dec.

4-5,

http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Porter-Smith-Hazett-RadioSpectrum.pdf(discussing
Coase theorem).

2009),

success of

121 See STEVE SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICANALYSIS OF LAW391-411 (2004) (discussing

the economic theory behind settlement negotiations).
122 See Sklaroff, supra note 5, at 296-97 (lowered transaction costs also mean that more exchanges

will be engaged within a firm, rather that with outside contractual parties).
123 On smart contracts as a disruptive technology, see Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain
in a Corner:The Disruptive Role of Blockchain Technology in the FinancialServices Industry and
Current Regulatory Issues, 25 CATHOLIC UNIV. J. L. & TECH. 353, 365 (2017) (discussing the
disruptive role of blockchain on the finance industry).
124 See generally SHAVE, supra note 121, at 296 (discussing economic theory behind why contracts
are made).
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Exhibit 3: Relative Transaction Costs by Contract Type
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Exhibit 3summarizes the relative transaction costs of six basic types of
contract: bespoke contracts, negotiated and drafted for specific situations, template
contracts, such as fill-in-the-blank leases, and contracts of adhesion drafted by one
party and offered to many others on atake-it-or-leave-it basis. Each type of
contract might be executed traditionally, or byusing code. For space, the Table
does not distinguish between hybrid smart contracts, in which code supplements
or implements awritten agreement, and code-only contracts, in which the code is
the agreement of the parties
Negotiating abespoke traditional orsmart contract is often costly. In a
sales contract, the parties must come toagreement onproduct specifications,
delivery terms, consequential damages, and so on. In asettlement agreement,
coming to aprice, the scope of release, and method of payment can be arduous.
This is mitigated by the parties' knowledge that legal doctrines will fill in the gaps
125 See supranote 62 and accompanying

text.
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in their contracts if problems arise with performance. This is particularly salient in
commercial contracts governed by the UCC, which contains elaborate rules
governing situations in which parties behave as if a contract exists when their terms
conflict.126 In turn, drafting the agreement is costly. It may be difficult to draft
terms that capture the agreement of the parties, and attorneys' fees to draft original
language can run high. 12 7 In a smart contract, the costs of drafting the contract now
include the costs to write code to implement the agreement, which raises the upfront costs of contracting. 12 8 This is especially true given current smart contract
technology, which is difficult to interact with or understand for people without
computer science training. While blockchains capable of housing smart contracts
may try to make themselves user friendly, they remain bewilderingly arcane for
non-programmers, far beyond the agony consumers may feel when reading
through boilerplate legalese in a written form contract.
Despite the increased cost to write code, a crucial difference between
traditional and smart is the costs to perform. Transferring assets through traditional
29
For example, when
contractual means often requires third-party involvement.'
executing the contract for purchase of a home, third-party escrow accounts are used
to hold funds, verifying title uses third-party services, and transferring and
recording deeds requires yet another. In a smart contract, by contrast, the nature of
blockchain eliminates the need for third-party intermediaries, lowering the
contractual distance for exchange. The code, which may have been costly to set
up, executes automatically without human intervention. The transaction costs
involved in execution may be very small, perhaps only the blockchain transaction
fees needed to perform transactions as the contract executes. In the ideal smart
contract, the reward of the, perhaps, high up-front cost of rendering an agreement
in code is the simplicity and certainty with which it executes. Breach may be costly
in either the smart or traditional case. In the real-estate example, a breaching party
often does not simply move out while handing the keys over to a perfectly
maintained residence. The transaction costs may be substantial, totaling months of
lost rent and legal costs involved in proceeding with an eviction.
A smart contract that ends up in court may similarly bear high transaction
costs, with the costs involved in breach depending on the type of contract. If the
contract only references information stored internally, that is, if the contract is
independent of external events or information, then the contract approaches the
See UCC § 2-207.
See SHAVELL, supra note 121, at 299-300 ("[Itmight take fifteen minutes to discuss and include
a term about what to do if the photographer is involved in a car accident on the way to the wedding,
but ifsuch an event is unlikely, it will not be worth the parties' while to include a provision for such
126

127

an outcome in the contract.").
128 See Sklaroff, supra note 5 (discussing the inherent inefficiency of forming "complete" smart
contractual agreements). In our framework, the low transaction costs from auto-execution will
balance out the higher up-front costs ofdrafting, or parties will choose not to smart contract.
1 2 9 See Jackson Ng, EscrowServiceas Smart Contract: The Business Logic, MEDIUM (May 19,2018),
htps://medium.com/coinmonks/escrow-service-as-a-smart-contract-the-business-logic5b678ebe1955.
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Garzik no-litigation ideal.1 3 0 In this way, the extra costs involved in coding the
contract pay off-by investing early on in making the contract purely selfreferential, the parties gain the advantage of certainty in execution. If the contract
does reference external events, such as through the use of an oracle or other means,
the cost of breach parallel those in traditional contracts. 3 1 One author noted "we
are, at the very least, many years away from code being able to determine more
subjective legal criteria, such as whether a party satisfied a commercially
reasonable efforts standard or whether an indemnification clause should be
triggered and the indemnity paid."1 3 2 If the parties have entered the smart contract
anonymously, known to each other only through smart contract addresses, then
dispute resolution may be impossible. This special case deserves attention and will
be discussed in the following Section.' 33
A template contract, which a party perhaps downloads from the internet
and fills in the blanks, has similar transaction costs to a bespoke contract, except
that the negotiation phase is less costly (the parties negotiate over the blanks, not
over every word), and the drafting cost is lower. Fill-in-the-blanks smart contracts
are also possible, with digital code ready to accept the parties' inputs. For instance,
Contract Vault centers its entire business model on the idea of creating smart
contract templates using markup, a common word-processing programming
system.1 34

In contrast, in modern adhesion contracts, transaction costs are different.
For the non-drafting party, negotiation costs are zero, save for possibly comparing
various non-negotiable offers and choosing among them. For the drafting party,
the fixed cost of drafting the initial contract can be very high. The drafting party
wishes to ensure that every eventuality is covered, as the contract will be
distributed to many contracting parties with many potential ways to breach. The
average cost of drafting, spread out over thousands or millions of customers, is
small. Once the contract is drafted, the cost of executing the individual contracts
may be large, such as maintaining cell phone towers, providing customer service
agents to deal with customers, and so on.135 For these contracts, transaction costs
See supra quotations heading the Introduction.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
132 Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts
and Their Potential and
Inherent
Limitations,
SKADDEN
(May
7,
2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/05/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts;
see
also Ibrahim Mohamed Nour Shehata, Arbitration ofSmart Contracts Part 1, WOLTERS KLUWER
(Aug. 23,
2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/23/arbitration-smartcontracts-part-l/.
133 See infra Section 5; DE FILIPi& WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 85 ("To file a lawsuit, an injured party
will need to know the identity of the opposing party. . . .").
134 Gordon Mickel & Perica Grasarevic, Next GenerationAgreementsfor Everyone on the Ethereum
Blockchain,
CONTRACT
VAULT
(last
visited
Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.contractvault.io/files/Whitepaper.pdf.
'35 See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1208-1209 (describing the use of adhesion contracts to house
"ride-along" text describing, e.g., customer service).
130
131
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These contracts typically contain
in case of breach are small, by design.
litigation costs down by keeping
keep
to
designed
are
which
provisions
arbitration
class actions, the means by
preventing
disputes in chosen arbitration locations and
small claims.
for
which most consumers might ordinarily find redress
Adhesive smart contracts generally have low transaction costs. The cost to
render the take-it-or-leave-it agreement to code may be high, especially with deals
that are not simple exchanges of values. Code requires unambiguity and
preciseness beyond a linguistic exchange. At the same time, as with drafting
traditional adhesion contracts, the costs to develop code are small when spread out
over thousands of consumers of the contract. After the smart contract is written,
the contract executes with the efficiency of code, and the contract may have dispute
resolution mechanisms built into the code itself, avoiding the costs of engaging the
court system.
V. ADHESIVE SMART CONTRACTS AND THE INCENTIVES TO
CREATE BOILERPLATE
This Section offers several suggestions to retain the efficiencies and lowdistance nature of smart contracts while avoiding a contractual regime in which
automatically executing code acts as a return to the sealed instruments of the past,
or in which smart contracts amplify the disadvantages of adhesion contracts and
extend them onto the blockchain.
A. Revenge of the Common Law
The common law of contracts evolved an elaborate set of doctrines to deal
with formation and execution problems in contract-such as the doctrines of
mistake, impracticality, and frustration of purpose. Mistake, for example, might let
one party out of contractual obligations if the other party knows and takes
advantage of the mistake.' 3 7 The doctrine of impracticality and impossibility allow
one out of contractual obligations in the event of circumstances unforeseen by
either party at the time of contracting, such as when an act of God fundamentally
alters the reasons for contracting, as in a contract to renovate a building destroyed
3
The concept of frustration of purpose
in a hurricane before work could begin.'
grew out of this, letting parties out of bargains not just when circumstances
rendered fulfilling the contract impossible but also when the basic purpose behind

id. at 1203-1206 (describing the practice of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts).
E.g., Anderson Bros. Corp. v. O'Meara, 306 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing potential
mistake ofthe capabilities ofa dredger).
138 E.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing
the commercial impracticality of meeting design specifications of a Filter press).
"'See
1
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the formation of the contract had been rendered void, such as the building to be
renovated being condemned to be destroyed by city legal action.1 3 9
Considering these doctrines in the context of smart contracts is instructive.
If the smart contract is hybrid to an agreement by known parties, then the parties
could appeal to the court system and resolve via traditional doctrinal application.
Similarly, if the contract has blockchain-based alternative dispute resolution built
into it, the anonymous jurors might consider the same ideas. The most interesting
cases occur if the smart contract code is intended to be the complete agreement of
the parties and the code fails to contain a dispute resolution mechanism. If the
parties have not anonymized the contract, they might take the code to court, hope
the court can understand Solidity, and attempt to implement common-law
solutions post-execution. If the parties are anonymous in a code-only contract, and
fail to include dispute resolution mechanisms, then they have no redress: their
counterparty is anonymous, and so cannot be sued.1 4 0 If the code does not allow
alternative dispute resolution, then the code simply executes with no possible legal
recourse.
In this final type of contract, the parties have essentially agreed to waive
legal remedy, trusting their agreement entirely to the algorithm. This possibility
should give pause.141 Common law contractual problems developed over hundreds
of years to resolve real-life problems in forming and resolving bargains.142 While
technology has changed in marvelous ways that expand the scope of what can be
contracted for, the basic problems that arise in exchange remain the same: purposes
will be frustrated, parties will have made mistakes, contractual objectives will be
rendered impossible by unforeseeable events, and so forth. Parties who have
agreed to remove their bargain from any possibility of adjudication, through courts,
blockchain-based juries, or otherwise, risk ignoring the evolved wisdom of
contract law.
Parties can take affirmative steps to avoid these general negatives of smart
contracts. First, the parties should be aware of the auto-execution of code, and so
smart contracts should be entered specifically looking forward to the potential for
disputes. Jurisdictions should generally recognize smart contracts as satisfying the
statute of frauds, but the technology is new and the law unproven.' 4 3 If so, the
139E.g., Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 604 (Mass. 1991)
(examining
frustration
of purpose in constructing concrete median barriers).
40
1 Completely anonymous, no-adjudication contracts could thus be considered
"complete" contracts,
in that every contractual possibility is either considered and coded, or excluded from the contract and
unenforceable by reason of anonymity.
141 From an economic standpoint, it is troubling that parties may find it rational to enter into
agreements without the possibility of recourse. Imperfect information about legal remedies, or
underestimating the probability of difficulties with the contract may contribute.
14 2

143

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 233.

See DE FmuPpi& WRIGHT, supranote 17, at 79-80 (discussing the enforceability of smart contracts
and concluding that memorializing an agreement in code should "make little difference, at least in
the United States"); Benjamin Van Adrichem, Enforceability ofSmart Contracts Under the Statute
ofFrauds,COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. (Jan. 31, 2018), http://str.org/2018/01/31/enforceability-of-
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parties should execute a document that satisfies legal formalities and keep the
smart contract hybrid. Dispute resolution mechanisms should be specifically
contemplated, whether by invoking blockchain protocols, or by specifying
traditional contractual remedies like liquidated damages, using an arbitration
clause, or forum selection clauses.
Second, in a hybrid smart contract, the parties should contemplate whether
code or the written document should control in case they conflict. Careful attention
to how code implements the intention of the parties helps, but transferring
understanding of real-world agreement into computing code is an imprecise art.
Most smart contracts today are some form of template contract, due to the high
cost of developing code to match the parties' intentions. Template contracts offer
the advantage of lower drafting costs, but may very imperfectly reflect the wills of
the parties.
Third, the nature of code development offers a particularly attractive path
forward for adhesion contracts. In law, it would be uncommon for natural persons
to find the cost of drafting lengthy boilerplate contracts worth the benefit. Large
adhesive contracts are generally drafted by large entities for acceptance by
consumers.1 4 4 In technology, however, open-source software development,
sustained in large part by the efforts of interested individuals, maintains large codebases used in countless settings. The collaborative nature of coding and the benefits
from maintaining open-source software incentivize large communities of
developers to contribute to projects.1 4 5 Smart contracts, as code, can maintain the
same advantages. Open-source banks of smart contracts or "chunks" of smart
contracts, tailored to a variety of settings, could be drafted and maintained by a
community of programmers. Rather than being drafted by a single entity with aim
to extract as much contractual surplus as possible, the open-source smart contract
community can function as an additional path to avoid the negatives of smart
contracts. The disadvantage of such open-source standardization is the incentive it
gives parties to adopt an agreement not memorializing their exact contractual
needs.146
Finally, courts should attempt to develop a deep understanding of not only
the technology behind blockchain-based disputes, but also of the incentives for
parties to adopt it. So far as contracts serve public policy purposes larger than
merely enforcing agreements, courts with a sound perspective on the larger issues

smart-contracts-under-the-statute-of-frauds/; Florian Moslein, Legal Boundaries of Blockchain
2018),
10,
(Nov.
. Self-Help?
as
Contracts
Smart
Technologies:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3267852 (discussing the legal enforceability of
smart contracts).
144 See BERMAN, supra note 4.
145 For example, Linux, which runs the majority of software applications around the world, is
OPENSOURCE.COM,
Linux?,
is
What
project.
open-source
an
as
maintained
https://opensource.com/resources/linux (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
146 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGT, supra note 17, at 86.
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involved in smart contract disputes will provide more surefooted guidance for the

law. 147
B. Smart Adhesion Contracts
Smart contracts of adhesion may offer special challenges and
opportunities. A true meeting of the minds never occurs in many consumer
adhesive contracts, as the consumer finds it rational to ignore most of the text to
which they purport to agree. The drafting party's power to control terms which are
blindly accepted then leads to problems with unfairness, unconscionability, and so
on.148 While consumer groups and market backlash to terms may temper this
somewhat, the drafting party in an adhesion contract has tremendous power. At
least in great part, these common problems in adhesion contracts stem from a
common fount: the drafting party in an adhesive contract does not fully trust its
contracting parties, and so must draft large amounts of boilerplate to cover the
many ways in which things might go wrong among its many customers. As the
costs of drafting will be spread out among many customers, it is worth the time in
drafting to cover these many scenarios. The boilerplate gets thick.
Smart contracts of adhesion offer an economic, rather than legal solution
to this problem. 14 9 Ironically, this solution stems from the major difficulty with
smart contracts discussed in the prior section: auto-execution and its effect on trust
issues.1 5 0 In addition to the low execution costs involved in auto-executing code,
the transactions costs in smart contracts are low because they offer novel ways of
ensuring trust from parties with incentives toward bad behavior. As trust issues
decrease, so does the need for contractual terms irrelevant to most consumers of
the contract. The auto-execution of conditional statements in code replaces the "ifthen" linguistic statements in traditional contracting, except now much is left to
auto-execution to exclude eventualities rather than boilerplate provisions

147 For example, the doctrine of unconscionability of form contract text arises from the
broad
conception of such form contracting being unfair from a policy perspective.
148 See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1169.
149 See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1206 (arguing for legal solutions to form contracting issues
and
noting "[aictual assent to each contract term in a transaction of complexity simply is not possible; if

terms are not imposed on one party by the other, some terms will almost certainly be imposed on
both parties by the government."). One solution, as we propose, is for economic incentives to simply
write fewer terms.
150 Absent such economic solutions, the problems with adhesive contracts are amplified in the smart
contract setting. The drafting party has the ability to draft the contract and control the code which
executes it. As code can be opaque to even trained legal minds, this puts ordinary consumers at a
disadvantage, particularly if the smart contract code is given preference over the written document

in case of conflict. Finally, as smart contract code executes automatically, it is difficult for equitable
ex post adjustments of contractual code to be implemented the way a phone call to a cell phone
provider customer service hotline might resolve an issue with contractual terms in the traditional
setting.
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contemplating them. 1 5' For example, a traditional contract for transfer of real estate
may contain boilerplate provisions stating that time is of the essence, that facsimile
signatures are binding, the currency which may be accepted for payment, effective
dates for if execution by buyer and seller differ in time, and so on. These clauses
cover many ways the contracting parties may do each other wrong. They may
delay, attempt to pay in a strange currency, argue about an event that occurs
between the time the parties sign, and so on. These are unnecessary in a smart
contract transferring assets. The time is embodied in the contract itself, which
might become unavailable to interact with if excessive time has passed. The issue
of facsimile signatures disappears, as the contract is executed via secure
blockchain wallets. The contract will accept only the specific coin for payment, by
design, and the contract will specify what occurs as the parties sequentially interact
with the contract. Due to the nature of the technology implementing the contract,
the incentive to write boilerplate is reduced.
This does not mean that smart contracts will be short. Smart contracting
restructures transaction costs relative to traditional contracting by increasing them
up-front through the costs to code and the increased precision required by code,
while lowering the costs in execution. In place of many legal eventualities, the
price of smart contracting is the need to render agreements more completely and
unambiguously than with traditional written agreements. The nature of code
incentivizes the drafting party to be precise, and it may take length to establish
precision. This type of length is different than length due to boilerplate
contemplating unlikely states of the world, which the algorithm will not let occur.
It is length that may invite agreement, rather than disincentivize it.152 At the same
time, length does not mean that smart contracts will be complete. Even very precise
smart contracts will not rationally contemplate every state of the world, and so
including specific mechanisms for dispute resolution is still wise.
From the consumer side, the incentive to understand a smart contract is
enhanced relative to a printed adhesion contract. Because the code will largely
auto-execute with reduced post-signing appeal to customer service, the accepting
party has increased incentive to understand the terms to which they are agreeing,
even if they are embodied in code.5 3 In other words, the blockchain-based,
1s1 See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1156 ("The common understandings that parties produce with
if-then statements are critical to contractual meaning."); Grimmelmann, supra note 10, at 3
(distinguishing "natural" and "formal" languages and arguing the "paradigm ofa legal contract is a

relation of legal obligation based on a natural-language instrument").
152 This is not to say that code can ever eliminate ambiguity. See Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
Rather, it incentives reduction of ambiguity due to the need to render agreements to code form, with
code's ability to auto-execute. When the parties have contemplated dispute resolution with the

agreement, any ambiguity left after drafting and coding can be resolved.
1

3

See DE FiIppi & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 74-75 ("Because smart contracts are autonomous in

nature, promises memorialized in a smart contract are-by default-harder to terminate than those
memorialized in a natural-language legal agreement. Because no single party controls a blockchain,
there may not be a way to halt the execution of a smart contract after it has been triggered by the
relevant parties."); Gilo & Porat, supra note 32, at 987 (in a traditional adhesion contract, one
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unalterable nature of the coded contract lowers the ability of the offeror to waive
breach or consider special circumstances, making a larger up-front investment in
understanding contractual terms rational for the offeree. 15 4 As more offerees find
it rational to inspect smart contract terms, particularly those with technical savvy,
this in turn lowers the incentive for drafters to include terms giving themselves
inefficient shares of contractual surplus vis-A-vis those with and without technical
expertise to understand code.' 5 5 In sum, the drafter of the adhesion contract has
less motivation to write boilerplate, and the acceptor of the adhesion contract has
greater incentive to understand the drafted terms. The significant problem of nonagreement in form contracts is thus lowered when moving to the smart contract
setting.
VI. CONCLUSION
Articles on blockchain sometimes cite Amara's law: "We tend to
overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect
in the long run."1 This is almost certainly true of smart contracts. Smart contracts
are a vogue topic with rather limited current use due to the substantial technical
challenges facing their implementation. At the same time, the ability to create
fractionalized digital representations of physical assets, which transfer without the
potential use of boilerplate is to send a signal to consumers of non-negotiability); but see Johnston,
supra note 33, at 858 (arguing that form contracts can facilitate bargaining). In this view, smart
contracts of adhesion represent an extreme in non-negotiability.
154 In a printed contract of adhesion, the implicit calculation made by a consumer is generally that
the opportunity cost of their time to read and understand the contract exceeds the expected slim of
the costs involved with problems with the contract, each problem weighted by the probability that
customer service will modify the contract ex-post or otherwise excuse breach. If the consumer
reasonably contemplates softness on behalfofthe drafter's agents, she rationally finds less incentive
to read. In an auto-executing adhesive smart contract, the probability that customer service will not
modify terms is one, as the contract will simply and inflexibly execute. The weighted sum of the
expected costs of breach is higher, and so the consumer rationally chooses to invest more time to
understand contractual terms. See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 1206 ("Because buyers are boundedly
rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers, when making purchasing decisions they take into
account only a limited number of product attributes and ignore others. While sellers have an
economic incentive to provide the efficient level of quality for the attributes buyers consider ('salient'
attributes), they have an incentive to make attributes buyers do not consider ('non-salient' attributes)
favorable to themselves, as doing so will not affect buyers' purchasing decisions. Assuming that price
is always a salient product attribute for buyers, market competition actually will force sellers to
provide low-quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs that will be passed along to buyers
in the form of lower prices. Ironically, the consequence of market forces in a world of boundedly
rational buyer decision making is that contracts will often include terms that are socially inefficient,
leave buyers as a class worse off(judged from the perspective of buyers' subjective preferences) than
they would be if their contracts included only efficient terms, and leave sellers as a class worse off
as well.").
155See Bakos, supra note 25, at 24 (noting that a "informed minority" paying attention to contractual
terms may discipline the drafters ofboilerplate contracts and tend towards efficiency). As parties do
so, the incentives to write boilerplate for purposes of obfuscation decreases. See Gilo & Porat, supra
note 32, at 987.
156See Levi & Lipton, supra note 9 (discussing
Amara's law).
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need for intermediaries, housed on shared digital ledgers which are replicated
around the world, has the potential to change the practice of contract law in
fundamental ways. Attorneys will find themselves increasingly needing to
understand how written agreements interact with the code meant to implement
them, requiring skills not traditionally taught in law school. Courts will find
themselves sidelined as blockchain-based dispute resolution mechanisms
increasingly supplement the traditional legal system.
Considering how this potential future of contract law intersects with its
present, in which the contracting process for many consumers is dominated by
adhesion contracts, is instructive. The nature of the blockchain decreases trust
issues in the contracting process, disincentivizing drafting boilerplate to capture
trust-based eventualities and incentivizing clarity due to the precision required by
code. At the same time, it raises the incentives for acceptors of adhesion contracts
to understand contractual terms, as they understand that post-signing modification
is unlikely due to the auto-executing nature of code. Together, this means smart
contracts of adhesion have the potential to increase actual agreement between
parties who do not trust each other, helping solve the key critique of form contracts
as not reflecting mutual understanding of contractual terms. The contractual
distance for many adhesive exchanges will thus lower, enabling the sociality of the
market in previously unrealized ways, such as is beginning to occur in the
environmental and film industries.
The efficiencies of blockchain-based adhesion contracting mean that code
will continue to take increasing legal significance as a way for parties to express
and execute their agreements. At the same time, code should not become law until
it incorporates the lessons from contract that developed in response to centuries of
real-life situations. Truly "smart" adhesive smart contracts will include dispute
resolution mechanisms that incorporate the safeguards built into traditional
contracting methods, lest parties find themselves repeating the same mistakes of
the premodern contracting era, which often prized formality over intention and
failed to incorporate principles of equity into dispute resolution. Calling for selfexecuting code to sustain these values is easier than implementing algorithms to
actually do so, but diligent practice by attorneys and computer scientists can yield
the benefits of smart contracts while mitigating their risks.

